JANE CADHLA ACADEMICS NEWS

 

 

FRENCH:

 

https://static.blog4ever.com/2011/01/462157/artfichier_462157_202036_201101212147127.pdf

 

 

 

285

 

 

The First Vietnamese Military Intervention in Cambodia

(1658 – 1659)

By

MAK PHOEUN AND PO DHARMA*

List of the Abreviations

 

 

BAVH : Bulletin des amis du vieux Hue, Hanoi-Haiphong.

BEFEO : Bulletin de l'École française d'Extrême-Orient, Hanoi, Paris.

BSEI : Bulletin de la Société des études indochinoises, Saigon.

BSGP : Bulletin de la Société de géographie de Paris, Paris.

EFEO : École française d'Extrême-Orient.

EPHE : École pratique des Hautes études.

JA : Journal asiatique, Paris.

JRAS : Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, London.

REO : Revue de V Extrême-Orient, Paris.

RHCF : Revue de l'histoire des colonies françaises, Paris.

RI : Revue indochinoise, Hanoi.

 

The first Vietnamese military intervention in Cambodia occurred in October 1658¹. The Vietnamese troops remained for several months in the Khmer country and never left Cambodia until the early of the following year, which was around March/April 1659². This first military intervention was preceded by forty-years of

 

 

 

(*) M. Nguyěn Thè Anh a bien voulu relire cet article et nous conseiller de le completer en deux endroits ; qu'il en soit ici remercié.

(1) Bien que cette intervention militaire vietnamienne soit la première en territoire khmer, les Cambodgiens et les Vietnamiens avaient déjà eu l'occasion de s'opposer militaire menta,u x xne et хшв siècles ; cependant, ils étaient alors éloignés géographiquement, étant séparés par le Campa, royaume hindouisé dont les frontières au xi« siècle s'étendaient au Nord jusqu'au col de Lao Bao, un peu au-dessus du site actuel de Hue" (cf. G. Ccedès, Les États hindouisés ď Indochine et d'Indonésie, Paris, 1964, p. 292-293 et p. 313 ; pour une histoire de Campa, cf. G. Maspero, Le royaume du Champa, Paris, 1928 ; J. Boisselier, La statuaire du Champa. Recherches sur les cultes et l’iconographie, Paris, Publ. de l'EFEO, 1963).

(2) Cf. p. 312, n. 4 et 5.

 

 

 

 

 

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relations more or less pursued between the two countries, relations primarily marked at the beginning by the marriage of a Khmer prince with a princess of the Nguyên, a Vietnamese leader family from  the South¹, and then, by the permanent presence of this princess, after the death of her royal husband, in the Cambodian royal court, Oudong. The Cambodian and Vietnamese sources did not agree on the course of this military intervention nor on its causes and consequences, we will try to shed light on this phase of the Cambodian-Vietnamese relations. To do this, we will use additionally to the Royal chronicles of Cambodia², the archives of the Vietnamese and Cham, the stories of missionaries and Western travelers of that time, in order to verify the accuracy of local sources and to complete them.

 

     The first point to be examined will be the internal situation of Cambodia before the intervention troops of Nguyên. It was characterized by the rivalries between two branches of the Khmer royal family represented the first one by the children of king Jayajetthã II (1619-1627) and the second by the younger brother of this king and of their descendants, rivalries which allowed the Vietnamese intervention. Second point to be examined will be this military intervention, which was preceded by a first participation of Vietnamese fighters alongside of the Khmer king in the battles which he led against the princes who had rebelled against him.

 

     We shall also have to examine the role played by the former queen - the Vietnamese wife of Jayajettã II - in 1642, during the takeover of power by Cau Bañã Cand who was going to become king Rãmãdhipatï I, and in 1658, during the revolt of the princes against the King, when she finally took side with these princes and called the troops from Huê to Cambodia.

 

 

(1) Les chroniques royales du Cambodge donnent à cette princesse le nom de Ang Cûv (cf. Mak Phoeun, Chroniques royales du Cambodge, de 1594 à 1677. Traduction française avec comparaison des différentes versions et introduction, Paris, Publ. de l'EFEO, 1981, p. 120). Selon des auteurs vietnamiens, elle s'appelait Ngoc-Van et était la troisième fille du seigneur vietnamien du Sud S ai Viromg (1613-1635) (cf. Thai-Vân-Kiam, « La Plaine aux Cerfs et la Princesse de Jade », BSEI, 4e trim. 1959, n. s., t. XXXIV, n° 4, p. 389 ; Pham Bính Khiêm, « Une grande page d'histoire oubliée : de l'alliance des cours de Hue et d'Oudong à la première ambassade à demeure du Vietnam au Cambodge au début du xvne siècle », Études interdisci plinaires sur le Vietnam, 1974, t. I, p. 150).

(2) Les différentes versions des chroniques royales du Cambodge actuellement connues s'échelonnent de 1818 (version de Nan, dont le manuscrit В 39/12/В de la bibliothèque de la Société Asiatique est l'une des copies) à la première moitié du xxe siècle. En plus de la version précédente, nous utilisons dans cet article principalement les versions P57, P63, VJ et DV. La version P57 (bibliothèque de l'EFEO), dont on ne connaît pas la date de rédaction,

a été retrouvée par E. Huber chez un mandarin cambodgien de Phnom-Penh ; la version P63 (bibliothèque de l'EFEO), a été rédigée en 1903 par une commission instituée par le roi Narottam, puis achevée par une autre sous le roi Sïsuvatthi ; la version VJ (bibliothèque de l'Institut Bouddhique de Phnom-Penh), dite de Várnň Juon, a été achevée au plus tard en 1934 ; la version DV (bibliothèque du Palais Royal de Phnom-Penh), dite de Vatt Dik Vil, a été reconstituée en 1941 d'après une version qui remonte au moins à 1901 (cf. Mak Phoeun, op. cit., p. 2-35).

 

 

 

 

 

287

The Successors of Jayajetthã II

 

     The death of king Jayajetthã II, husband of the Vietnamese princess Añg Cùv, took place in 1627, as his elder son, prince Srï Dhammarãjã (Cau Bañã Tù) was still a frock. This death announced to Cambodia a period of fights for power between both families of the Khmer royal family, a fight which has considerably weakened the kingdom.

 

     Arguing that the king’s eldest son was in orders and that his juniors should not ascend the throne before their senior, the high ranking dignitaries gathered to commemorate the death of the king, invited Ubhayorãj Paramarãjã (Uday), the younger brother of the king and uncle of prince Sri Dhammarãjã (Cau Bañã Tù), to take possession of the throne. But this prince did not accept the invitation, preferring to keep the throne for his nephew, and in the meantime, to govern the kingdom with the title of Ubhayorãj, a noble title that is usually reserved for a king who abdicated.

 

     However, this Ubhayorãj that the Dutch documents presented as a man “of medium height, good look and loved by all for his good-nature personal qualities”¹, who refused the throne because he considered himself too old, loved his own niece, princess Ang Vati, the daughter of his brother, the former king Jayajetthã II, and a fiancee of prince Sri Dhammarãjã, whom he married². He then invited this prince to leave the frock and to ascend the throne. The new sovereign did not settle in Oudong, the capital at that time, but in Koh Khlok, an island of Mekong located just in the Northeast of Phnom Penh. A war will soon break out between King Srï Dhammarãjã I (Cau BañãTu) and his uncle, Ubhayorãj Paramarãjã (Uday), about princess Ang Vatï. The King was killed by the European mercenaries who supported his uncle in 1632³.

 

     Again, instead of ascending himself on the throne, Ubhayorãj Paramarãjã (Uday) offered the kingship to prince Cau Bañã Nù, another son of Jayajetthã II, who had the title of Añg Dañ Rãjã. But it was Ubhayorãj who took care of the affairs of the kingdom and held the actual power. The young sovereign Añg Dañ Rãjã (Cau Bañã Nù) died in June, 1640.

     A third opportunity thus offered Ubhayorãj Paramarãjã (Uday) to become king. Renouncing again the highest office, he then proposed his elder son, prince Añg Nan, to the assembly of the high

 

 

(1) Cf. W. J. M. ВUсн, « La Compagnie des Indes Néerlandaises et l'Indochine », BEFEO, 1937, t. XXXVII, fasc. 1, p. 200. Cette description a été faite au moment de l'audience accordée par ce prince au marchand de lre classe hollandais Jan Dircsz. Galen en 1636.

(2) Au Cambodge, dans la famille royale, le mariage était permis entre frères et soeurs consanguins et utérins, mais non entre frères et soeurs germains (cf. J. Moura, Le royaume du Cambodge, Paris, 1883, t. II, p. 49, n. 1 ; cf. aussi A. Cabaton, « La vie domestique au Cambodge », RI, févr. 1910, n° 2, p. 105).

(3) Le Hollandais Van Wuysthofî, qui a traversé le Cambodge en 1641 pour se rendre au Laos, dit, en parlant de Koh Khlok, résidence du roi Sri Dhammarâjâ Ier (Cau Banâ TQ), qu'on y trouve « les ruines de l'habitation du roi, qui, il y a neuf ans, fut vaincu par son oncle, le vieux roi actuel, fait prisonnier, et étouffé entre deux oreillers » (cf. Van Wuysthoff, « Voyage lointain aux royaumes de Cambodge et Laouwen par les Néerlandais et ce qui s'y est passé jusqu'en 1644 », annoté par F. Garnier, BSGP, 1871, VIe série, n» 2, p. 252).

 

 

 

 

288

Geanology Table of the Cambodian Royal Family in 17^th

Century

 

 

Mak Phoeun and Po Dharma

 

 

SEE PAGE 288 OF THE ORIGINAL FRENCH VERSION.                                                                          

 

 

 

 289

 

dignitaries who accepted the proposal, thus excluding the other sons of former king Jayajetthã II from the throne.¹ Marrying with princess Ang Nâ Ksatrï, the daughter of Jayajettã II and the former queen of Vietnamese origin queen, Añg Cùv, and elevating her to the dignity of queen, the new monarch, “gifted with gentleness and an attractive figure”,² took the title of Padumarãjã I.

 

     Prince Satthã (Cau Bañã Cand), the son of Jayajetthã II, considering himself as the legitimate heir of the throne and thinking that he was a victim of an unfair decision, because he is the son of the king while Padumarãjã I (Ang Nan), the new monarch, was only a son of Ubhayorãj, prepared secretly a plot against his uncle and his cousin. He had them murdered in January, 1642, proclaimed himself king and took the title of Rãmãdhipati I. ³

 

     Dutch documents mention several massacres during the seizure of power by King Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand), especially the high ranking officials who supported the former Ubhayorãj Paramarãjã (Uday) and his offsprings. If the entire responsibilities of these crimes fall to this king, a part of the responsibility of the events is also attributable to the former Ubhayorãj Paramarãjã (Uday).⁴

 

 (1) Le prince Satthâ (Cau Banâ Cand), si on en croit les sources européennes, avait encore un ou peut-être deux frères, alors que les sources khmères portent qu'après la mort de Aňg Dan Râjà (Cau Banâ Nu), il restait le seul fils vivant de Jayajetthâ II (cf. le tableau

généalogique de la famille royale du Cambodge au xvne siècle in fine).

(2) Cf. A. Cabaton, «Les Hollandais au Cambodge au xvne siècle», RHCF, 2 e trim. 1914, n° 6, p. 174.

(3) Bien que les chroniques royales du Cambodge soient restées muettes à ce sujet, il semble qu'un autre fils de Jayajetthâ II ait été encore vivant au moment de la prise du pouvoir par le roi Râmâdhipatï Ier (Cau Banâ Cand). Ce prince aurait été plus âgé que Râmâdhipatï Ier puisque les Hollandais rapportent que le nouveau roi associa d'abord « son

frère aîné » à la couronne, mais que par la suite il s'en débarrassa en le faisant assassiner sous l'accusation d'adultère (cf. F. Garnier, « Chronique royale du Cambodge », JA, 1871, t. XVIII, n° 67, p. 364, n. 1 ; A. Cabaton, op. cit., 1914, p. 177 ; cf. aussi Relation des missions des évesques françois aux royaumes de Siam, de la Cochinchine, de Camboge, & du Tonkin &c. Divisé en quatre parties, Paris, 1674, p. 141.

(4) Du fait de son comportement à l'égard de la fiancée de son neveu, il avait violé la volonté de son frère aîné et roi qui, de son vivant, s'était engagé au su de tous à marier Srï Dhammarâjâ (Cau Banâ TQ) avec cette princesse. Après avoir pris la fiancée de ce prince, s'il était monté lui-même sur le trône comme il en avait le droit puisque les grands dignitaires en assemblée l'avaient invité à le faire— rappelons qu'au Cambodge la couronne était here ditaire et élective : tous les membres de la famille royale pouvaient aspirer à régner, mais les grands dignitaires en assemblée avaient le droit de choisir celui des membres, dans la famille royale, qui leur paraissait le plus digne, celui qui leur convenait le mieux (cf. A. Leclère, Recherches sur le droit public des Cambodgiens, Paris, 1894, p. 7) — , cela aurait clarifié la situation avec le prince Srï Dhammarâjâ (Cau Banâ Tu), qui n'aurait alors sans doute pas eu les moyens militaires pour s'opposer à lui, évitant ainsi des troubles au royaume, la détériora tiodnes relations entre les deux branches de la famille royale, et pour reprendre un mot des Hollandais, « de tristes suites économiques » pour le pays (cf. W. J. M. Bugh, op. cit., p. 200; la révolte « du plus jeune fils du roi » dont parlent les Hollandais était très vraisemblablement plutôt celle de son neveu, le roi Srï Dhammarâjâ Ier). D'autre part, cela lui aurait permis d'offrir le trône à son propre fils Padumarâjâ Iei (Ang Nan'), sans fournir au prince Satthâ (Cau Banâ Cand) un prétexte pour prendre les armes contre lui.

 

 

 

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King Rãmãdhipatï I (Cau Bañã Cand)

 

 

Born in 1620 from Anak Mnãn Pussâ, origin Laotian, king Râmâdhipatï I (Cau Bañã Cand) was educated at the monastery of Preah Put Leay Leak, in Bâbaur, province of Kampong Chhnang. At the age of 18, under the reign of his brother Ang Dan Rãjã (Cau Bañã Nù), he had, according to the royal chronicle, commanded the royal troops which went to put down a revolt at Roleang Kroeul, in the current province of Kampong Speu, defeated the rebels and captured their leaders ¹. The Dutch people, who did not like the king, having been suspected by him to be allies with the Siamese, and having serious trouble with him, do not provide a nice description about the king, showing him as cruel, superstitious and indulging drinking ². The Royal Cambodian chronicles described him as a tortured prince by the remorse for having murdered his uncle.

 

     However, the fact is that this monarch is in his denial: the religion of the Buddha does not seem to him a safe heaven enough to allow him to escape from the consequences of having ordered the assassination, he turned to Islam because the Malay and Cham spiritual leaders had promised him that he would be freed from his sins by Allah ³.

 

     Marrying a young Malay woman, he was purified spiritually and proclaimed himself a Muslim ⁴, then encouraging his officials to do the same, and this was certainly from the very first years of his reign. As a result, the European texts referred to him under the name of Ibrahim ⁵, whereas the Khmer documents gave him, at the same time another name more or less formal than Rãm Cul Sãs (n) ⁶.

 

(1) Mak Phoeun, op. cit., p. 334-337.

(2) W. J. M. ВUCH, op. cit., p. 217 et 226.

(3) Cf. Mak Phoeun, op. cit., p. 190 et p. 349-351.

(4) En dehors de la version des chroniques royales du Cambodge dite de Vâmn Juon (VJ) (cf. Michael T. Vickery, Cambodia after Angkor, the Chronicular Evidence for the Fourt- eenth to Sixteenth Centuries, Michigan, University Microfilms International, 1977, vol. I, p. 261, n. 139), d'autres versions des chroniques royales du Cambodge font aussi état de la

conversion du roi Râmâdhipatî Ier (Cau Banâ Cand) à l'islam, en particulier la version dite de Valt Sitpur, dont l'une des copies était conservée à la bibliothèque de l'Institut bouddhique de Phnom-Penh (le manuscrit P48 de l'EFEO). Ce monarque n'aurait pas, selon les missionnaires de la Compagnie de Jésus, embrassé spontanément la religion des Malais et des cam musulmans. Il aurait balancé quelque temps entre le christianisme et l'islam, avant de décider finalement d'adopter cette dernière religion. Selon ces mêmes missionnaires, la reine s'était même d'abord déclarée pour la foi chrétienne et avait réclamé aux Pères des images saintes, mais, ajoutent-ils, « cette Princesse ne fut pas fidèle à sa vocation » (L'État présent de V Église de la Chine et des autres roiaumes voisins, Paris, 1670, p. 123 ; cette épouse du roi Râmâdhipatï Ier (Cau Bauâ Cand) dont font état les missionnaires de la Compagnie de Jésus n'était sans doute pas la jeune Malaise que ce roi avait épousée peu avant sa conversion à l'islam).

(5) W. J. M. Висн, op. cit., p. 214 ; A. Cabaton, op. cit., 1914, p. 177.

(6) Litt. « (le roi) Râm qui est entré dans la religion (musulmane) ».

 

 

 

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     It is almost certain that king Rãmãdhipatï I (Cau Bañã Cand), cut off from his own people because of his many cruelties and unable to trust anyone sought to become close to the Malays and Cham Muslims, thanks to those who helped him, it seems he got rid of the former Ubhagorãj Paramarãjã (Uday) and his followers, and could access to the throne¹. The very close relationship that this king had with the Malay and Cham Muslims appear to have widened the gap between him and his people, who accused him for abandoning “the noble Buddhist Religion, noble Vihãr, noble monasteries, noble citiy, as well as the noble rules and Palis text”.²

 

     A registration (K.166) seems somewhat mitigate the image that the chronicles portrayed king Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand) completely away from his Buddhist people because of his conversion to a foreign religion. This registration, which indeed refers to the monarch under the title of Rãm Cul Sãs (n), reported donations from him to a monastery in the province of Kampong-Thom,³ suggesting that he had not quite forgotten Buddhism, but in contrary he tried to embrace this religion and its religious leaders – thus with his people in spite of his conversion to Islam. Moreover we

will see later that after this king's troops defeated by the army of Vietnamese intervention, the supreme leader of the community of monks accompanied by relatives and supporters of the former monarch, preferring to leave the Khmer country and take refuge in the country of Siamese, that what, like the previous fact, makes people think that king Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand), and also most certainly his family and supporters, had maintained contacts with the Cambodian Buddhist clergy.

 

 

Relations with Nguyen after Jayajetthã II died

 

The Vietnamese archives do not seem to have reported a precise relationship between the Cambodian court of Oudong and the Vietnamese court of Huê before the Nguyen's first military intervention in Khmer country in 1658. This event was written in the Gia-dinh thong chi, a book of Trinh-hoai-Duc, a mandarin of the emperor Gia Long and his son - Ming Mang.⁴ For modern historians of Vietnam the relations between the Khmer kings and Ngyuên had begun with this attack.⁵ But according to the royal chronicles of

 

(1) Les chroniques royales du Cambodge ne font pas état de ce concours des Malais et des cam musulmans lors de la prise du pouvoir par le roi Râmâdhipati Ier (Cau Banâ Cand), mais les documents hollandais et anglais en font état (cf. Winkel, « Les relations de la Hollande avec le Cambodge et la Coehinchine », RI, 1906, n.s., t. IV, n° 46, p. 1762 ;

Quarles Browne, A Relacon of the Scituation & Trade of Camboja, alsoe of Syam, Tunkin, Chyna & the Empire of Japan..., in D. K. Basset, « The Trade of the English East India Company in Cambodia, 1651-1656 », JRAS, 1962, p. 55).

(2) Chronique royale dite de Vâmn Juon (VJ) (cf. Mak Phoeun, op. cit., p. 190-191).

(3) Cf. E. Aymonier, Le Cambodge, I, le royaume actuel, Paris, 1900, p. 443-444.

(4) G. Aubaret, Gia-dinh-Thung-chi. Histoire et description de la Basse-Cochinchine, Paris, 1863, p. 2. (5) Cf. entre autres G.-B. Maybon, Histoire moderne du pays ďAnnam (1592-1820), Paris, 1919, p. 116 ; LE Thành Khôi, Le Viêt-Nam, histoire et civilisation, Paris, 1955, p. 266.

 

 

 

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Cambodia, as well as the story written by the missionaries, these relationships had started earlier, probably from the reign of Paramarãjã VII (Sri Suriyobarm) (1601-1619) and were further developed during the reign of his son and successor, Jayajetthã II, who was the husband of the Vietnamese princess, Ang Cuv.

 

     The death of the late king did not interrupt the relationship between the royal court of Oudong and the court of Huê, but instead it seemed to strengthen them more and more, because the Vietnamese wanted, according to the royal chronicle DV, to obtain the good graces from the new Khmer king and his successors, in the obvious intention to extend the deadline for the rights of living and collecting customs fees in Kampong Krâbei¹ and Prei Nokor², these rights of settling Vietnamese people and collecting customs fees were obtained in 1623, during the reign of Jayajetthã II³.

 

     After the death of her royal husband, the Vietnamese princess Ang Cuv had continued to reside permanently in Cambodian capital, Oudong. Although no longer queen, since the crown was transmitted to king Sri Dhammarãjã I (Cau Bañã Tu), her influence becomes growingly very important. Throughout the period of the advent of the last ruler in 1627 until the Vietnamese military intervention in 1658, it was this princess who represented de facto the interests of the Vietnamese court of Huê in the Khmer country, acting as a powerful figure ⁴ of the Vietnamese authority who represented Vietnam in the South. The royal chronicle DV mentioned the recurrent relations between the princess Ang Cuv and the court of Huê. The time that her royal husband was alive, before the Vietnamese embassy come to ask the rights of settling and collecting customs fees in the two provinces of Koh Krâbei and Prei Nokor, her father had previously sent her a message urging her to intervene with her husband to give a favourable answer to the request. After the death of Jayajetthã II and with the accession of Sri Dhammarãjã I (Cau Bañã Tu) to the throne, she sent a message to the leader of Huê to let him know about these events. And after receiving this message, the leader of Huê sent to Cambodia his ministers and many soldiers with numerous gifts to celebrate the events, especially the one concerning the coronation of the new king. Relations between the two courts, firstly marked by the Vietnamese concern to obtain the rights of living and collecting customs fees in Kampong Krâbei and Prei Nokor, were then characterized by the need to permanently preserve these rights. --As the deadline approaches, the duration of these rights of living and collecting customs fees in Kampong Krâbei and Prei Nokor that was limited to five years,-- the group of Vietnameses mentioned above had the mission, additionally to participate different  ceremonies, to ask the new king Sri Dhammarãjã I (Cau Bañã

 

(1) En vietnamien Bên-nghé (nom donné par les Vietnamiens à la ville nommée par les Européens sous l'appellation de Saigon, cf. G. Aubaret, op. cit., p. 194, n. 1).

(2) L. Malleret propose de localiser Prei Nokor dans la région de Cholon (cf. L. Malleret, « A la recherche de Prei Nokor. Note sur l'emplacement présumé de l'ancien Saigon khmèr », BSEI, 1942, n. s., t. XVII, n° 2, p. 19-34).

(3) Mak Phoeun, op. cit., p. 148-149 et p. 303-304.

(4) Cf. J. Bouchot, « Saigon sous la domination cambodgienne et annamite », BSEI, 1926, n. s. t. I, p. 13.

 

 

 

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Tu) to grant the former  queen Ang Cuv the dignity title of Samtec Brah Dav Dhita usually reserved for the Queen Mother or the first princess of the blood, giving her the power to intervene with King to convince him to give up the claims seeking the return to Khmer kingdom of Customs of the provinces mentioned above. The royal chronicle DV said that the princess, Ang Cuv was, as expected, given the title of Samdec Brah Dhitâ Dav, and the Vietnamese leader, in order to increase the power and authority of his daughter, permanently provided for her whole disposal two Vietnamese mandarin and five hundred soldiers from his country.¹

 

     The story written by Father Cristoforo Borri, a missionary from Milan who had lived in Cochinchina from 1618 to 1622 - this term Cochinchina, representing the territory of the Nguyên at that time² – may help to shed light on some aspects of the relationship between Oudong and Huê, although his writing applied rather to the years when he stayed in Cochinchina, that was the time when Jayajettã II ³ was still alive. In any case, this story seems to confirm the statement of the Royal chronicles DV as regards the permanent presence of Vietnamese mandarins in the Cambodian capital, the presence that is perfectly in line with the planned intention of the Nguyên to be close to events that may happen in Cambodia. Describing the conversion to the Christianity of a famous woman, Father C. Borri asserts that she was the wife of the ambassador that the King of Cochinchina was going to send to Cambodia, and at the time of this conversion, the ambassador in question was at the court, dealing with the King of Cochinchinna the affairs of his embassy. The story reveals later that the ambassador, as noted by Bonifacy, the translator of the text, lived permanently in the Cambodian capital and in the kingdom had a palace and a group of women, and he was described as an “ordinary” ambassador. On the other hand, the diplomat who was accompanied by a group of horsemen and women, returned regularly to his country to talk and report to his sovereign without doubt the situation in Cambodia, and in spite of the very often “danger of the sea”, just to quote the words of his wife, because the embassy for which he was in charge when he met Father C. Borri was not the first nor the only one,  he was a high ranking figure in Cambodia, where his ships were also well known⁴.

 

(1) Mak Phoeun, op. cit., p. 314.

(2) Sur ce nom, cf. L. Aurousseau, « Sur le nom de la Cochinchine », BEFEO, 1924, t. XXIV, p. 563-579 ; P.- Y. Manguin, Les Portugais sur les côtes du Viêt-Nam et du Campa, Paris, Publ. de l'EFEO, 1972, p. 42, n. 2.

(3) Cf. « Les Européens qui ont vu le vieux Huê : Cristoforo Borri. Préf. par L. Cadière. Notice par Ch. B. Maybon et trad, de la Nouvelle Mission au Royaume de Cochinchine par Bonifacy », BAVH, juil.-déc. 1931, p. 209-405. Pour une première traduction de ce récit, cf. Christofle Borri, Belalion de la nouvelle mission des Pères de la Compagnie de Iesus au

royaume de la Cochinchine, trad, de l'italien ... par le P. Antoine de la Croix ..., Lille, 1631. (4) Cf. « Les Européens qui ont vu le vieux Huê : Cristoforo Borri ..., op. cit., p. 362-372. L'ambassade dont fait état le Père C. Borri eut lieu soit à la fin de l'année 1620, soit au début de l'année 1621 puisqu'elle a été rapportée dans une lettre du Père Gaspar Luis datée de Macao le 17 décembre 1621 et puisque, selon le Père Cadière, la conversion de l'ambassadeur et de son épouse au christianisme eut lieu peu avant le 9 décembre 1620 (cf. L. Cadière,

 

 

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     It therefore appears that the Vietnamese princess Ang Cuv was not isolated in the Khmer country. Having at her disposal mandarins and Vietnamese soldiers, endowed with the highest dignities allowing her to have a real Court¹, she was going to use her influence to serve the cause of her country. In fact the first opportunity that presented to princess Ang Cuv to intervene with the Khmer king was the request to extend the period of rights of living and collecting customs fees in Kampong Krâbei and Prei Nokor that she presented during the reign of the successor of Sri Dhammarãjã I (Cau Bañã Tu), King Ang Dan Rãjã (Cau Bañã Nu), who reigned from 1632 to 1640. Having seen that the duration of these rights was largely exceeded, the king, in agreement with his ministers, had decided not to renew these rights. Having learned about this decision, princess Ang Cuv intervened with the king asking him to give it up temporarily, arguing that the war between her country and “Chinese” was not yet over. Due to the respect he has for the princess, the king Ang Dan Rãjã (Cau Bañã Nu) postponed his decision².

 

     It is to note that the Vietnamese princess Ang Cuv knew perfectly how to do to be integrated within the royal family of Cambodia and how to gain powerful influence to young Khmer princes, as wells with children of Jayajettã II as those of Uabhayorãj Paramarãjã (Uday). The Royal Chronicles of Cambodia have outlined her role immedi-   ately after the seizure of power by King Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand) in 1642. Asso- ciating with other members of the Cambodian royal family and some of monks, she had asked the new ruler of the kingdom to save the lives of the young princes who were the descendants of his victims, Ubhagorãj Paramarãjã (Uday) and King Padumarãjã I (Ang Nan), among of whom was her own grand son, prince Sri Jayajetth son of Padumarãjã I (Ang Nan) and her own daughter Ang Nâ Ksatri who will become also a Queen³.

 

et de son épouse au christianisme eut lieu peu avant le 9 décembre 1620 (cf. L. Cadière, « Lettre du Père Gaspar Luis sur la Concincina », BAVH , juil.-déc. 1931, p. 414 et p. 135-138 du texte original reproduit dans le même Bulletin) ; cependant, rien ne prouve comme le pense Pham Dinh Khiêm, que cette ambassade soit la même que celle dont la mission était

de demander la cession provisoire des douanes de Kampong Krâbei et de Prei Nokor (ambassade de 1623, cf. Pham Dinh Khiem, op. cit., p. 158, n. 19).

(1) La dignité de Samtec Brah Dâv, réservée à la reine-mère ou à la première princesse du sang, permettait à sa titulaire de jouir d'un apanage de trois provinces et de posséder ses propres mandarins.

(2) Mak Phoeun, op. cit., p. 337. Par « Chinois », il faut comprendre les Trinh, seigneurs vietnamiens du Nord. C'est en invoquant les guerres entre les « Chinois » et leur pays que les Nguyën, selon la chronique

royale DV, avaient demandé la cession provisoire de ces douanes.

(3) S'agit-il de cette même princesse dont font état les textes hollandais, qui la qualifient de mère du roi Ràmàdhipatî Ier (Cau Banâ Cand), et qui affirment qu'elle avait sauvé du massacre un des enfants de l'ancien ubhayorâj, qu'elle avait ensuite adopté ? (cf. A. Cabaton, op. cit., 1914, p. 177). Ce dernier prince serait plutôt, nous semble-t-il, le prince Kaev Hvâ (Aňg Im), troisième fils encore vivant de Vubhayorâj qui plus tard, comme on le verra, prit le parti du roi Râmâdhipati Ier (Cau Baňa Cand) contre celui de ses propres frères. Quoi qu'il en soit, des trois fils encore vivants de Г ubhayorâj Paramarâjâ (Uday) mentionnés par les chroniques royales, les deux aînés, ceux-là mêmes qui plus tard prirent la tête de la rebellion contre le roi Râmâdhipatï Ier (Cau Banâ Cand) étaient très attachés à la princesse vietnamienne, la servaient, et recherchaient son amitié.

 

 

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     If we believe N. Gervaise, this princess would also have played an important role in the seizure of power in January 1642 by King Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand). This missionary who, around 1682, was assigned to the Mission of Siam and lived in this country for four years¹, provided many details of her action. According to him, the regent Nac Barachia, who is Ubhayorâj Paramarãjã (Uday) had planned the death of prince Nac-Channe, the future king Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand), in order to preserve for him the crown which was kept after the death of his brother (Jayajettã II) and which should be transferred to Nac-Channe when he will be at the age to be crowned. The Vietnamese princess (Ang Cuv), after learning of this project, warned prince Nac-Channe who, feeling threatened, has made his uncle mudered. But Khmer people, after this assassination, wanted to revenge for the victim, who was extremely appreciated because of his good actions during the years of his reign, and went to the royal palace. And the Vietnamese princess intervened again to calm the angry people. She succeeded thanks to her speech. Thus, thanks to her, that prince Nac-Channe could escape the mob and ascends the throne². The story written by N. Gervaise

 

(1) Cf. Nouvelle biographie générale depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'à 1850-60, Copenhague, 1966, t. XIX-XX, p. 331.

(2) N. Gervaise, Histoire naturelle et politique du royaume de Siam divisée en quatre parties, Paris, 1688, p. 262-265. Peut-être considérera-t-on les informations fournies par N. Gervaise avec une certaine suspicion en arguant qu'elles ont été obtenues par celui-ci quarante ans environ après les événements dont elles font état— ce qui peut avoir contribué à déformer certains souvenirs— en arguant aussi que cet auteur passe sous silence l'existence de deux rois, Sri Dhammarâjâ Ier (Cau Banâ Tu) et Ang Dan Râjà (Cau Baňa Nu), premiers fils et successeurs de Jayajetthà II

— il considère en revanche le prince Cau Banâ Cand comme le fils aîné de ce dernier souverain — en arguant enfin qu'il ignore totalement le roi Padumarâjà Ier (Ang Nan'), fils de Yubhayorâj Paramarâjâ (Uday), qui avait été couronné en juin 1640, comme le mentionnent les sources hollandaises (cf. p. 287-289), et qui fut aussi assassiné sur ordre du prince Cau Banâ Cand. Mais ce silence peut s'expliquer par le fait que le régent Paramarâjâ (Uday) occupa la charge d'ubhayorâj, depuis le décès de Jayajetthà II en 1627 jusqu'aux événements du début de 1642, date de son assassinat, et que les règnes de ces trois «jeunes rois» purent paraître n'avoir pas d'importance, et donc passer inaperçus, d'autant plus que les trois monarques n'exercèrent jamais eux-mêmes le pouvoir qui était entièrement détenu par Yubhayorâj, exception peut-être pour Sri Dhammarâjâ Ier (Cau Banâ Tu), qui d'ailleurs, comme on l'a vu, ne résidait pas dans la capitale Oudong, mais plutôt à Koh Khlok (le Père J. Tissanier, de la mission du Tonkin, dans la Relation du voyage du P. Ioseph Tissanier de la Compagnie de Iesus, depuis la France, iusqďau Royaume du Tunquin. Avec ce qui s'est passé de plus memorable dans cette Mission, durant les années 1658, 1659 & 1660, Paris, 1663, p. 261-262, fournit les mêmes données puisqu'il dit que Râmâdhipatï Ier (Cau Banâ Cand) avait pour tuteur le frère du roi son père, qui au moment de sa mort l'avait nommé à cette fonction ; mais ce tuteur résolut de retenir pour lui le royaume, et le neveu devenu grand lui ôta la vie. Le Père J. Tissanier passe donc aussi sous silence les trois rois Sri Dhammarâjâ Ier (Cau Banâ Tu), Ang Daft Ràjà (Cau Baftà Nu) et Padumarâjà Ier (Aňg Nan'), et ceci certainement pour les mêmes raisons que celles que nous d’invoquer. Comme les autres voyageurs européens, N. Gervaise fait mention d'un autre fils vivant de Jayajetthà II au moment de la prise du pouvoir par le roi Râmâdhipatï (Cau Banâ Cand). Il le désigne simplement comme le frère de celui-ci alors que les autres documents européens affirment qu'il était son aîné (cf. p. 289, n. 1 et 3), à moins que ces derniers documents ne fassent état d'un autre prince. Enfin, on peut aussi se demander pourquoi la princesse vietnamienne Aftg Cuv prend le parti de l'ennemi de son gendre — le roi Padumarâjà Ier (Aftg Nan') était marié à sa fille Aftg Nà Ksatrï — mais là encore, on sait que ce dernier souverain n'était roi que par la grâce de son père Vubhayorâj Paramarâjà (Uday) et qu'il n'eut jamais de pouvoir réel, celui-ci restant entre les mains de Ubhayorâj.

 

 

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showed that the Vietnamese princess Ang Cuv was the real instigator of the events which contributed to the assassination of Ubhayorãj Paramarãjã (Uday) and the accession of King Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand), while the royal chronicles of Cambodia, apart from her involvement with senior figures to save the lives of the young princes, the descendants of former Ubhayorãj, make no statement of her participation or that of Vietnamese men at her disposal to the events that led to Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bãnã Cand) the throne. By contrast, for the following period, the royal chronicle P 57 indicates that the Vietnamese princess obtained on her request from king Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand) the privilege of holding the office of Uparãj (or Ubhayorãj), dignity reserved for the highest royal princes, that allowed her to control the royal affairs and to have a royal decision-making power as the king himself,¹ reflecting the importance and the influence of Ang Cuv over King Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand) who granted to the princess all the highest honours surely to pay debt back for all help previously got from this princess.

 

 

 

The revolt of the princes

 

     The descendants, still alive, of the previous Ubhayorãj Paramarãjã (Uday), as mentioned in the royal chronicles of Cambodia were four, namely his sons Padumarãjã (Ang Sur), Uday Surivans (Ang Tan) Kaev Hva (Ang Im), and his grand-son Sri Jayajetth, who is also the grand-son of the former Vietnamese queen Ang Cuv.

 

     The European documents, as for Jayajettã II, mentioned that the number of his descendents is higher than the number of Ubhayorãj Paramarãjã’s (Uday) descendants. According to the Dutch, the princes, who were qualified as grand-sons of the late Ubhayorãj were five, namely Nacpra Boemton, Nac Préaute, Nac Ciricitit, Nacpra Odel and Nac Praang². We can identify the first two sons of the late Ubhayorãj mentioned by the royal chronicles, and the third as certainly, prince Sri Jayajetth, grand-son of princess Ang Cuv. These documents also mention another prince, Nac Promkiea, that king Ibrahim, that means Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand), chose to be the heir of the throne, and that seems to be prince Kaev Hva (Ang Im)³.

 

 

(1) Mak Phoeun, op. cit., p. 353.

(2) Cf. W. J. M. Bugh, op. cit., p. 229.

(3) Dans une lettre de Pieter Kettingh, chef du comptoir néerlandais au Cambodge, adressée au gouverneur général des Indes Néerlandaises et datée de mars 1658, le nom de ce prince a été orthographié Nac Prom Kiefa, ce qui nous a conduit à reconnaître en lui le prince Kaev Hvâ (Ang Im) (cf. Dr. Hendrik P. N. Muller, De Oost-Indische Compagnie in Cambodja en Laos. Verzameling van bescheiden van 1636 M 1670, 's-Gravenhage, Martinus Nijhoff, 1917, p. 371). M. P. Lamant a bien voulu nous faire traduire le texte de cette lettre. Qu'il en soit vivement remercié. Pour un compte rendu de l'ouvrage précédent, cf. A. Cabaton, « Les Hollandais au Cambodge et au Laos au xvne siècle », Tijdschrifl van het Koninklijk NederlandschAardrijkskundig Genootschap, 1919, 2e s., t. XXXVI, n° 5, p. 596-609.

 

 

297

 

     According to N. Gervaise, the total number of children, still alive, of former Ubhayorãj was five, namely: Nac Protien, Nac-Cotrei, Nac-Prachoufa, the latter also mentioned as the eldest, Nac-Tam and Nac-Pane. The first two seemed to be the first sons of Ubhayorãj mentioned in the royal chronicles and the third prince Kaev Hva (Ang Im)¹.

 

     Spared by King Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand) during the massacres ordered by him when he took power, and also after, these descendants of Ubhayorãj Paramarãjã (Uday) served the king, but they seemed, noted the Dutch texts, N. Gervaise and royal chronicles, always to look for an opportunity to revenge the death of their father, that explained the lack of trust and suspicion of the monarch towards them. If the main cause of the revolt of these princes is known, it is not the same for the immediate process that triggered their revolt.

 

     Whatever the causes, this rebellion broke out on Jan. 25, 1658. Two parties found themselves involved: on one hand, king Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand), assisted by prince Kaev Hva (Ang Im), whose troops consisted partially of Malay, of Cham Muslims, as well as of Vietnamese, and on the other hand, princes Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) and Uday Surivans (Ang Tan), supported by their other brothers (or nephews, as Sri Jayajetth). The party of the princes recruited their supporters in the southern provinces (Bati, and Banteay Meas Treang) and moved to Phnom Penh. As the king had embraced Islam and granted great privileges to Malays and Chams, the mandarins and the common people, said the royal chronicles, joined in great numbers the revolt of the princes². Military confrontation took place thereafter, first in Prek Ta Ten, between Phnom Penh and Kampong Luong, and secondly in the province of Samrong Tong.

 

     Pieter Kettingh in his letter dated from March 1658³, said the beginning of hostilities. King ãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand), who hunted the elephant Babur (Bâbaur), ordered to Oija Ininerat (who is the minister Ukañã Yomarãj) to kill prince Padumarãjã (Ang Sur). Having learned about this order five days before the date set for his assassination, Prince Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) and his four brothers, captured, January 25, 1658, all the guns (probably City of Oudong) and sixty elephants, then during the night, marched on the Residence of

.

 

 

(1) La forme cambodgienne de ce nom Nac-Prachoufa doit être Anak Brah Cau Hvâ {il semble y avoir une confusion possible entre les deux titres Kaev Hvâ et Cau Hvâ). Comme dans tous les autres documents, ce prince, qui avait reçu du roi des charges importantes, est décrit comme ayant pris le parti du roi Râmâdhipatï Ier (Cau Banâ Cand) ; son fils Nac-Non, c'est-à-dire le futur ubhayorâj Padumarâjâ (Ang Nan') des chroniques

royales, ayant de plus été adopté par le roi et ayant été désigné comme héritier présomptif de la couronne (N. Gervaise, op. cit.. p. 265-272).

(2) Mak Phoeun, op. cit., p. 191-192.

Selon les Hollandais, « les Malais, qui avaient converti le roi, abusèrent de leur prépondé rancete l e rendirent tellement haï, que le prince Nacpra-Bomton et son frère (...) trouvèrent grand nombre de partisans » (Winkel, op. cit., p. 1771).

(3) P. N. Muller, op. cit., p. 371 sq.

 

 

 

 

 

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Ukañã Yomarãj, where a battle happened for two or three hours between the partisans of the princes who had revolted and people of the prince Kaev Hva (Ang Im), who was at Ukañã Yomarãj house. The rebel princes won the battle and burned the house of the minister, while the prince Kaev Hva (Ang Im) and other high ranking officials fled. Prince Kaev Hva (Ang Im), accompanied only by two or three people, hide first in a temple located in the Portuguese quarter, then on a Danish ship, where a hundred of his soldiers came looking for him¹. On that first night of war, rebel princes saw them come to them in a large number of armed men. They already had a force of 8,000 combatants, and the next day from 10,000 to 12,000 men. The troops of the rebel princes burned the houses of prince Kaev Hva (Ang Im) and other ministers, then camped near the big market they had also burned, while prince Kaev Hva (Ang Im) and the king's ministers, surrounded with 2,000 Cambodian and Malay soldiers, camped near the small market. Other military operations took place thereafter, during which there was the presence of Vietnamese fighters alongside the prince Kaev Hva (Ang Im). King Pãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand), injured by elephants at Bâbaur, left this province only in February, and came in March, with reinforcements of troops, to conduct assaults against the rebel princes. These princes were largely equipped with fire-arms and ammunition but were cut off from the outside world, while the king's army had only a few firearms and used mostly bows and arrows. Despite this, it seems that the king’s troops have had success, although there was still no determining battle².

 

What was, at the beginning of this princes' revolt, the attitude of the Vietnamese princess Ang Cuv? If we refer to the royal chronicles VJ and P 63, the rebel princes had surrendered, at the surprise of the king, in Phnom Penh where they openly rebelled. They have invited princess Ang Cuv to follow them, after having convinced her first to take their side and after she sent a request for assistance from the Vietnamese leader in Hue. According to the royal chronicle DV, it is princess Ang Cuv who had initially asked the king for her and for the two princes Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) and Uday Surivans (Ang Tan) the permission to come to Phnom Penh, and it's only after they arrived in this town that the two princes recruited supporters, openly rebelled against the king and asked the Vietnamese princess to seek the help from leader of Huê. According to the royal DV chronicles, it was the Vietnamese princess who was on the side of the rebel princes against king Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand)

 

 

 

(1) Les missionnaires de la Compagnie de Jésus rapportent qu'un prince, qui avait auparavant cherché à maltraiter le Père Léria, fut attaqué par ses propres frères et eut toutes ses maisons brûlées ; ce prince chercha refuge auprès du même Père qui le persuada d'aller se cacher dans un vaisseau danois (cf. UÊlat présent..., op. cit., p. 39 ; ce récit, qui ne donne pas le nom de ce prince, affirme qu'il était cousin du roi du Cambodge).

(2) W. J. M. Висн, op. cit., p. 230 ; A. Cabaton, op. cit., 1914, p. 191.

 

 

 

299

 

from the beginning of the outbreak of the revolt. However, another royal chronicle, the P 57 version, does not highlight the participation of the Vietnamese princess in the rebellion, during its first phase.

According to this column, the two princes, who had resolved to revolt against the king, invited their brother Kaev Hva (Ang Im) to join them. But this one, just pretending to commit to their part, informed the king of this project¹. Having learned this, the two princes fled to the province of Samrong Tong and took up arms against the monarch. Only later, during the open revolt of the princes, the Vietnamese princess, always remained in the capital, would have requested troops from the Vietnamese leader of Huê ².

 

     N. Gervaise provided other details to show that to princess Ang Cùv had lately joined the princes. According to this author, king Rãméadhipatï I (Cau Bañã Cand) having raised prince Kaev Hvâ (Ang Im) to important responsibilities and having declared this prince, the son of the later as an heir of the crown, the other children of Ubhayorâj Paramarãjã (Uday), driven by jealousy and loss of hope, rebelled openly against the King. Prince Kaev Hvâ ( Ang Im), who had joined the cause of the king, asked for help from the Vietnamese princess Ang Cuv, with whom the monarch was in bad terms since some time ago³, and he has written on the behalf of the King to the leader of Huê for a military aid. A group of two hundred armed men was sent to help him and the rebel princes withdraw into the forest. Ignoring that the Vietnamese court of Hue helped King Rãmãdhipati (Cau Bañã Cand), the rebellious princes dispatched their two young brothers to Hue asking for help. After waiting in vain for the news and their coming back, and learned that the Vietnamese princess had quarrelled with the king, prince Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) tried to seek for her support. The princess gave him help right away, rather “by the inclination she felt for the Prince, than by aversion she had for Nac-Channe”. She promised to write to the leader of Hue, asking him to send troops to rescue the rebel princes⁴.

 

     The story of N. Gervaise confirms that the Vietnamese princess Ang Cuv chose to side with the princes, but she did not do from the beginning of the revolt, since according to him, the princess would have first allowed prince Kaev Hvâ (Ang Im) to ask the troops from Hue, which then helped the king to a victory and that only later she took side with the opposition. N. Gervaise is not the only one to notice the participation of Vietnamese fighters in the fights

 

 

(1) Cette information expliquerait peut-être l'attitude du roi Ràmàdhipatï Ier (Cau Banâ Cand) qui, selon Pieter Kettingh, comme on Га vu, avait ordonné de faire tuer le prince Padumarâjâ (Aňg Sur) (cf. p. 297).

(2) Mak Phoeun, op. cit., p. 191-193 et p. 352-356.

(3) Pour les causes de cette brouille, voir p. 305.

(4) N. Gervaise, op. cit., p. 266-268.

 

 

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MAK PHOEUN AND PO DHARMA

 

which took place during the uprising of the princes against king Rãmãdhipatï I (Cau Bañã Cand). The Dutch sources also mentioned it, Pieter Kettingh noted their presence in the army of Prince Kaev Hvâ (Ang Im) from February 13. He said the number of “Cochinchinese” who participated in a fight to seize two trenches arranged behind the Dutch buildings amounted to one hundred and fifty men. Vietnamese fighters also participated in another fight to seize a strong hold that held by troops of the rebel princes and lost four men. The presence of Vietnamese armed in the group of the prince Kaev Hva (Ang Im) on the day of the attack on the stronghold mentioned above, and then during a visit to the Khmer sovereign made in March by Prince Kaev Hva (Ang Im ) and nobles of the kingdom is also

confirmed ¹.

 

 

 

Causes of the Vietnamese Military Intervention

 

 

Until 1658, and since at least the reign of Paramarãjã VII (Sri Suriyobarm), father of Jayajettã II, the main concern of the sovereigns of Cambodia, in foreign policy, was the Siamese threat, because this country did not abandon its plan to invade Cambodia and put it under its domination. And it is precisely in part to devote himself entirely to this Siamese threat that king Paramarãjã VII (Sri Suriyobarm) had decided at the end of his reign, to establish links with the Vietnamese leader Sai-Vuong. In the short term, his thinking proved to be justified since a few years later, Jayajettã II had to fight against a Siamese invasion, that he pushed it away². It's still this threat that explained the reason why Jayajettã II has accepted the Vietnamese request for rights of living and collecting the customs fees in Kampong Krâbei and Prei Nokor. Later, under Sri Dhammarãjã I (Cau Bañã Tu) in 1631, the Khmer led an

attack against Korat ³. Then in 1644, under Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand), it was the court of Ayudhya who launched its ships to attack the Khmer kingdom, in collusion with the Dutch who had sent a squadron to Cambodia to punish her (Cambodia) for having murdered the leader of their port carriage Pieter de Rogemortes. The royal chronicle P 57 states, after that, the intention of the Khmer king, in 1657 to attack Siam by taking advantage of troubles happened in Ayudhya following the death of King Prasat T'ong (1630 –

 

 

(1) H. P. N. Muller, op. cit., p. 376-380. Lors de cette visite, le prince Kaev Hvâ (Ang Im) fut d'abord prié de rester avec ses Vietnamiens hors de la présence du roi Râmâdhipatï Ier (Gau Banâ Cand), qui avait appa remment des soupçons à son encontre. Le prince Kaev Hvâ (Ang Im) et les combattants vietnamiens purent néanmoins prêter serment au roi, après quoi ils se séparèrent «en bons termes ».

(2) Cf. G. Ccedês, Les peuples de la péninsule indochinoise, Paris, 1962, p. 148; W. A. R. Wood, A History of Siam, Bangkok, 1924, p. 168 ; Mak Phoeun, op. cit., p. 132-146 et p. 290-302.

(3) Mak Phoeun, op. cit., p. 164-165 et p. 319-322.

(4) W. J. M. Buch, op. cit., p. 222.

 

 

 301

1655)¹.  But it is the Siamese troops, in 1658, at the time of the revolt of the princes that had invaded the western provinces of Cambodia².

 

     It is therefore normal that the Khmer monarchs have had their eyes turned toward Siam more than to the eastern borders of the kingdom where the Nguyen, who were newcomers busy preparing war against the Trinh, appeared otherwise as allies, at least not as enemies, the two courts have established friendly and family relationships and the Khmers have temporarily made available to Vietnamese, on their request, land and customs of Kampong Krâbei and Prei Nokor.

 

     In 1658, the situation changed. A Vietnamese military invasion occurred on the order of the South Vietnamese leader Hien Vuong (1648 - 1687), also known as Nguyen Phouc Tan, who was the grand-son of Sai Vuong, and thus the nephew of Vietnamese princess Ang Cuv. According to Vietnamese sources, that military action had its origin in a border violation. The Phû bien tap luc and the Dai nam thuc luc tien bien indicate that in that year of 1658, “the king of Cambodia Nac Chan attacked the border”³ while the Phoung dinh du dia chi reported that Khmer's incursion at the border⁴. From its part, Gia dinh thông chi stated in the year of 1658, that “the king of Cambodia Neac-Ong- Chan (...) violated the Annamite borders”.⁵

 

     No Vietnamese sources specify the place where the violation occurred at the border, it is to note that until 1658 the Khmer kingdom and the Huê court were not bordering, their territories are separated by country of Cham. Certainly, after the annexation by Nguyen, several Cham provinces - which was Khautharâ⁶ in 1653⁷ - the Khmer kingdom had in the east, a common border with the Vietnamese country. But the border was actually a very large hinterland consists of uplands, covered with forests, inhabited by hill tribes, difficult to cross⁸ and it's inhospitable that the various maps published in the 17th century, called “Desert of or Loneliness of Cochinchina”⁹. It is therefore almost impossible

 

 

(1) Mak Phoeun, op. cit., p. 351-352. Pour les troubles survenus à Ayudhyâ, cf. W. A. R. Wood, op. cit., p. 189-190.

(2) W. J. M. Висн, op. cit., p. 230 ; A. Cabaton, op. cit., 1914, p. 191.

(3) LE Qui ©on, Phû bien tap lue, Saigon, 1972, t. I, p. 88 ; Bai nam thuc 1цс tien bien, Hanoi, 1962, t. I, p. 98.

(4) NguyIn Siêu, Phucrag dinh du* dja chi, Saigon, 1960, p. 188.

(5) G. Aubaret, op. cit., p. 2.

(6) Le territoire cam connu sous le nom de Kautharâ occupait approximativement une région correspondant à ce qui fut jusqu'en 1945 la province vietnamienne de Khanh-hôa (dinh de Thái-khang et phù de Diên-khanh).

(7) Après la prise du Kautharâ par les troupes de Hiên-Virang, il ne resta plus aux cam que le Pânduranga, qui recouvrait approximativement le territoire de ce que fut jusqu'en 1975 les provinces de Binh Thu£n et de Ninh-Thufn (C. B-Maybon, op. cit., p. 113; J. Boisselier, op. cit., p. 374-375).

(8) H. Maître (Les jungles Moï. Mission Henri Maître 1909-1911, Paris, 1912) confirme la difficulté de pénétration dans cet hinterland, même au début du xxe siècle. (9) Cf. par exemple la carte publiée dans A. de Rhodes, Divers voyages et missions du P. Alexandre de Rhodes en la Chine, et autres royaumes de VOrient..., Paris, 1653 et reproduite

dans H. Chappoulie, Aux origines ďune église. Rome et les missions d'Indochine au XV II* siècle, Paris, 1943, t. I.

 

 

 

 

302

 

 

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that Khmer troops could venture into this area. To attack the Nguyen, they would have had to pass along the coast, that means going through the Pânduranga¹. Yet none of the Cham history mentioned any transit of Khmer soldiers through Panduranga at that time².

 

     We wonder about the reality of the matter reported by the Vietnamese archive as the Royal Cambodian chronicles do not refer, at any time, to any expedition towards the Vietnamese country, and that all local documents or European mention that from the begining of 1658 the Khmer country was the scene of confrontation between troops that loyal to king Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand) and supporters of the rebel princes Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) and Uday Surivans (Ang Tan), this fact shows that Khmer king had other concern than the one dealing with border issues with the Viet country. It is to note also that Vietnamese historians have also questioned the assertion according to which Khmer king Rãmdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand) had violated the boundary of the Nguyen. Thus, Phan Khoang writes:

     “As regards the causes of this expedition, the archives Thuc luc tien bien, Cuong Muc and Gia dinh thành thông chi report the same thing: Nac Ong Chan attacked the first Vietnamese border. We believe that these are official information given by the mandarins of the Nguyen who wanted perhaps to hide the marriage of princess Nguyen with the Khmer king at the time”³. For his part, Pham Van Son thinks that the attack on the Vietnamese border by the army of King Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand) is uncertain, Cambodia did not have the option to launch this attack because according to the author, to enter into the Vietnamese territory by land, Khmers would have had to cross the territory of the Cham and to get there by sea, Khmer Kingdom would have had a sufficient number of warships, which was not possible⁴.

 

     For the Cambodian royal chronicles, the reasons of the Nguyen's military intervention in the Khmer country are different: the Vietnamese attack was decided by the leader of Hue accordingly of the request made to him by the former wife of Jeyajettha II, the Vietnamese princess Ang Cuv. The Royal Chronicles VJ, P 63, DV, and other versions, add that the request of the former Vietnamese queen had been sent to the Hien-Vuong on behalf of the princes Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) and Uday Surivans

 

 

(1) Selon le Père A. de Rhodes, la frontière entre la seigneurie de Huê et le royaume cam était fixée en 1653 au douzième degré de latitude Nord (A. de Rhodes, op. cit., p. 63) et se situait donc un peu au Nord de Cam-ranh, alors que selon les Vietnamiens, en 1659, la rivière

de Phan-raner servait de frontière entre les deux pays (L. Aurousseau, « Charles B.-Maybon. — Histoire moderne du pays d'Annam... » (compte rendu), BEFEO, 1920, t. XX, fasc. 4, p. 87), bien que des zones d'influence aient pu exister de part et d'autre du fleuve (P.- Y. Manguin — « Études cam IV. Une relation ibérique du Campa en 1595 », BEFEO, 1981, t. LXX,

p. 260, n. 2 — qui cite le Bai пат Щ1 truyÇn, pense qu'après l'attaque du campa par les Nguyen, en 1653, la frontière entre les deux pays se situait plus au Nord, aux environs de Cam-ranh).

(2) Voir en particulier Po Dharma, Chroniques du Pânduranga. Introduction, textes et traductions annotées (Thèse EPHE, 4<* Section), Paris, 1978.

(3) Phan Khoang, Vi$t sir x& dàng trong, Saigon, 1971, p. 403, n. 2.

(4) Рндм Vàn Son, Vi$t su- tân bien, Saigon, 1959, vol. III, p. 297.

 

 

 

 

303

on behalf of the princes Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) and Uday Surivans (Ang Tan), son of Ubhayorâj Paramarãjã (Uday), who rebelled against king Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bana Cand) ¹.

 

     These data from the Cambodian Royal chronicle is consistent with those stories of Western authors. The Dutch, who do not indicate the nationality of the princess, suggested she was the “mother” of the princes who had revolted².   N. Gervaise by contrast specifies that the architect of the Vietnamese military intervention in Cambodia was the former Vietnamese queen, wife of Jayajetthã II, but notes by mistake that she was the daughter of the Vietnamese leader at that time³, she was an aunt of Hien Vuong, since he was a grand son of Sai-Vuong, the father of Ang Cuv. The Vietnamese authors have also recognized the role of Ang Cuv in this affair⁴, and Pham Dinh Khiem was even surprised that the sources of the Vietnamese “insist on not to mention anything about the intervention of the former Queen of Cambodia, the aunt of the Vietnamese leader conspiring”⁵.

 

.     A missionary, Father J. Tissanier, who lived in 1658-1660 in Tonkin, in the North of Vietnam, also highlighted the request for assistance from the Nguyên's court by the Khmer princes who had rebelled against their king, but he stayed silent about the role of princess Ang Cuv. According to Father, it was the rebel princes who had called for their help “the King of Cochinchinese, in order to satisfy their passion, and put Kingdom of Cambodia in the hands of a foreigner. The Cochinchinese was not unhappy to win a new kingdom”⁶. In this regard, A. Leclere writes in a note that according to the doc-

 

 

(1) Mak Phoeun, op. cil., p. 191-194 et p. 356-359. La chronique royale DL/2 (f. 75, a), rédigée par Naň, donne à cette ancienne reine le

simple qualificatif d'« auguste mère », alors que la chronique royale B39/12/B (t. I, p. 35), du même auteur, porte qu'elle était vietnamienne. Selon Doudart de Lagrée et Francis Garnier, qui ont utilisé la chronique royale DL/2, cette princesse était la mère du roi Râmàdhipati Ier

(Cau Baňa Cand), alors qu'elle était en réalité sa belle-mère (A. B. de Villeméreuil, Explorat ionesl missions de Doudart de Lagrée..., Paris, 1883, p. 31 ; F. Garnier, op. cit., p. 368). С B.-Maybon, qui cite F. Garnier, dit la même chose au sujet de cette princesse (C. B.-Maybon,

op. cit., p. 116, n. 2). Selon G. Maspero, cette princesse était la mère des deux princes qui s'étaient révoltés contre le roi, alors qu'elle était en réalité leur tante par alliance (G. Maspero, L'empire khmer. Histoire et documents, Phnom-Penh, 1904, p. 63 ; cet auteur dit par erreur

que les deux princes révoltés étaient fils de l'ancien roi Jayajetthâ II). A. Leclère et J. Moura font aussi état de cet épisode de l'histoire du Cambodge, mais J. Moura le place par erreur en 1654 (A. Leclère, Histoire du Cambodge depuis le Ier siècle de notre ère..., Paris, 1914, p. 351 ;

J. Moura, op. cit., t. II, p. 61-62).

(2) W. J. M. Висн, op. cit., p. 230 ; Winkel, op. cit., p. 1771 ; il fallait dire « leur tante par alliance ».

(3) N. Gervaise, op. cit., p. 268-269.

(4) Citons par exemple Phan Khoang, op. cit., p. 203 ; NguyIn V&n QuÉ, Histoire des pays de Г Union Indochinoise..., Saigon, 1932, cité par Thaï Vân KiÊm, op. cit., p. 385.

(5) Ph^m DInh Khièm, op. cit., p. 162, n. 1.

(6) Relation du voyage du P. Ioseph Tissanier..., op. cit., p. 262.

H. Chappoulie, utilisant surtout les récits des missionnaires, a souligné également le rôle de l'ancienne reine d'origine vietnamienne qui, dit-il, noua contre le roi khmer Ramadhipatï Ier (Cau Baňa Cand) « des intrigues qui aboutirent à une intervention militaire du seigneur de Huê ». Mais cet auteur écrit que l'ancienne reine d'origine vietnamienne était

belle-soeur du roi khmer, alors qu'elle était comme on Га vu, sa belle-mère (H. Chappoulie, op. cit., t. I, p. 167).

 

304

 

 

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uments Vietnamese, the Khmer princes, who rebelled against their king had sent to Hue to seek his help, had renounced all their rights to the throne of Cambodia if he would help them to revenge the murder of their father¹. It seems that this author, who also tried to dismiss this claim, did not review directly the Vietnamese history on this point, but just quote Truong Vinh Ky as he previously mentioned ².

 

      It appears from what has been said that the Vietnamese military intervention in 1658 because possible because of strong dissension within the Khmer royal family and was conducted to help princes who had rebelled against their King. The idea according to which it was a response to the Khmer aggression cannot be acceptable only as a pure pretext that is perfectly in line with the interventionist purposes of the Vietnamese court in Huē.

 

     Since approximately the second decade of the 17th century, which saw the inception of the

relations between the kings of Cambodia and the Nguyen leaders, many Vietnamese, vagabonds, deserters, exiles and others, had settled inside the Khmer kingdom, particularly at border areas and lived among the Cambodian population⁴. The relations between Khmer and Vietnamese communities were probably not always very cordial and incidents occurred⁵, especially the establishment of

 

(1) A. Leclère, op. cit., 1914, p. 351, n. 1.

(2) TmroNG Vïnh Ky, Cours d'histoire annamite à V usage des écoles de la Basse-Cochinchine, Saïgon, 1877, vol. H, p. 136. Cet auteur laisse entendre que le roi Jayajetthâ II, étant près de mourir, nomma un de ses

frères régent et tuteur de son fils, mais que l'oncle ambitieux, s'étant emparé du trône, son neveu réussit à le tuer. Les quatre fils laissés par le régent résolurent de venger la mort de leur père, se révoltèrent et appelèrent à leur secours le roi de Cochinchine, Hiên-Virang, en lui

offrant l'abandon de leurs droits à la couronne du Cambodge, s'il voulait les aider à assurer leur vengeance. Tnrang Vïnh Ky précise que ce récit ne constituait pas la version vietnamienne des faits, mais plutôt la version cambodgienne, alors qu'aucune chronique royale du Cambodge

ne contient un récit semblable. Le fait de présenter l'ancien ubhayorâj Paramarâjâ (Uday) comme faisant fonction de régent, comme tuteur du prince Cau Bafiâ Cand et comme ayant laissé quatre fils après sa mort suggère plutôt une autre source, qui nous paraît être l'ouvrage

du Père C.-E. Bouillevaux publié trois ans auparavant (VAnnam et le Cambodge. Voyages et notices historiques accompagnés ďune carle géographique, Paris, 1874, p. 355-356) et qui ne se réfère pas, pour ce point précis, à des chroniques royales du Cambodge, mais plutôt à des

missionnaires, dont le Père J. Tissanier.

(3) С B.-Maybon, op. cit., p. 116 ; Le ThXnh Khôi, op. cit., p. 266.

Ce dernier auteur écrit que les Nguyěn étaient intervenus au Cambodge parce qu'ils avaient été sollicités par les princes khmers qui s'étaient révoltés, et aussi par les bouddhistes qu'indignait la conversion de leur roi à l'islam. Le même auteur écrit ailleurs que les Nguyën étaient intervenus au Cambodge parce qu'ils avaient été sollicités par l'un des partis khmers

(LE Thanh Khôi, Histoire du Vietnam des origines à 1858, Paris, 1981, p. 267).

(4) G. Aubaret, op. cit., p. 2.

Les deux territoires cambodgiens habités à cette époque par des Vietnamiens et signalés par le Gia dinh thông chi étaient Mô-xôai (Ba-ria) et £>ông-nai.

(5) Tnrang Vïnh Ky, puisant sans doute dans les sources vietnamiennes, fait état de l'oppression du bon peuple (vietnamien) par le roi khmer, tandis que P. Boudet fait état d'incidents résultant de vols de bétails (cf. Trito-ng Vïnh Ky, op. cit., p. 135 ; P. Boudet,

 

 

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Vietnamese settlers is perceived by Cambodians as the preparing steps to the future and complete annexation of these territories¹.

 

     Maybe should we have to enumerate the incidents which have encourage the court of Hue to intervene as mentioned by the royal chronicle DV, which reported that king Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand), before as his brother the king Ang Dan Rãjã (Cau Bañã Nù), said during a meeting held before the revolt of princes in January 1658 that he would like to get back the rights of living and collecting customs fees in Kampong Krâbei and Prey Nokor granted to Vietnamese, because now the war between Vietnamese and Chinese is over². But this time once again the Vietnamese princess Ang Cùv talked to Khmer king, using the pretext that the territory of Prey Nokor would facilitate her Vietnamese people to keep relations with her. Due to respect to her, king Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand) renounced his claims³. A second fact reported by N. Gervaise may have caused grievance of the Nguye against the Khmer king. According to this author, Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand) would have ordered the assassination, with the advice of some of Malay, a Vietnamese ambassador, and this assassination, combined with the conversion of the king to Islam, would have been the cause

of quarrel between this king and the Vietnamese princess⁴. As any other sources, except maybe omitting this point, has mentioned this assassination, it is likely that N. Gervaise has confused with the one committed in November 1643 against Pieter de Rogemortes, the chief of port carriage, at the moment where he went to court with few of his countrymen and twelve of soldiers⁵.

 

     For the rest, N. Gervaise seems not to believe that this assassination, if it really happened, was the cause of the Vietnamese intervention because according to this author, when king Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand) went to court in Cochinchina, the Vietnamese king did not show any grievance to him, but on the contrary he gave him back the crown of Cambodia and asked his soldiers to escort the Khmer king back to his kingdom ⁶.

 

« La conquête de la Cochinchine par les Nguyën et le rôle des émigrés chinois », BEFEO, 1942, t. XLII, p. 120). On observera que ces incidents n'éclataient jamais hors du royaume khmer, mais toujours à l'intérieur de ses frontières, car les Cambodgiens n'allaient pas s'installer sur les terres des Nguyën.

(1) C. B.-Maybon, op. cil., p. 116 j Nguyen Thanh-Nha, Tableau économique du Viet Nam aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, Paris, 1970, p. 17.

Pierre Poivre, qui visita la Cochinchine en 1748-50, note au sujet de l'annexion du Dông-nai par les Vietnamiens, que ces derniers « cherchèrent quelques mauvaises querelles aux Cambodgiens et s'emparèrent de leur pays » (cf. « Voyage de Pierre Poivre en Cochinchine.

Description de la Cochinchine (1748-50)», REO, 1887, t. III, p. 412; L. Malleret, Pierre Poivre, Paris, Publ. de l'EFEO, 1974, p. 176).

(2) La fin des hostilités entre les Nguyen et les Trinh eut lieu en réalité en 1673 (cf.

Le Thanh Khoi, op. cit., 1955, p. 250).

(3) Mak Phoeun, op. cit., p. 353-354.

(4) N. Gervaise, op. cit., p. 267-268.

(5) W. J. M. Висн, op. cit., p. 219 ; A. Cabaton, op. cit., 1914, p. 181.

(6) N. Gervaise, op. cit., p. 272.

 

 

 

 306

 

MAK PHOEUN AND PO DHARMA

 

     It is clear that the Court of Hue measured every advantage it could derive from a military intervention in Cambodia, which would address incidents resulting from Vietnamese settlements in the territories Khmer, consolidating these settlements, which would continue its expansionist policy toward South at the expense of Cambodia, a country with “fertile plains that stretch without limit to the Gulf of Thailand”¹, and appeared as a “beautiful prey”², or at least as “easy prey”. Also, in this perspective, the request for assistance from the rebellious Khmer princes to Hien-Vuong through the Vietnamese princess Ang Cûv, even if she wanted to use a pretext for intervention by the Court of Hue, which did not fail to enjoy such a good opportunity since, as we shall see, the two khmer princes, authors of this request of intervention would soon learn to their cost, that the Court of Nguyen has not only intervened in Cambodia to help “hunt” king Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand), but mainly to defend its interests. And the royal chronicle D 57 is probably right when it writes that princess Ang Cuv sent a message to her nephew Hiên-Vuong :

     “In the kingdom of Kambuja (...), there is currently war and upheaval. If (the king of Viêt) is raising troops to help the party of the August Pûdummarãjã and the August Udaiy-Rãjã, the kingdom of Kambujã will surely become his vassal”³.

 

     That the terms of this letter is accurate or not, they clearly highlight, in any case, one of the reason of the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia, namely: the continued expansionist policy towards the South and the commitment to place the Khmer kingdom under the Nguyen’s suzerainety, policy that would be realized, as will be seen by the attempted intervention of the Vietnamese troops, once king Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand) is eliminated from the political scene, then to capture the two Khmer princes Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) and Uday Surivans (Ang

Tan '),

 

(1) Le Thanh Khoi, op. cit., 1981, p. 266.

(2) Truonc Vinh Ky, op. cit., vol. II, p. 135.

Au sujet de cette volonté de conquête de la seigneurie des Nguyên, d'autres historiens vietnamiens ont donné leurs opinions. Citons entre autres Hoàng Cao Khài qui écrit : « Les seigneurs Nguyën pensaient que la politique expansionniste vers le Sud était un objectif à poursuivre. Comme le campa et le Cambodge étaient deux pays peuplés, à cette époque, de gens sauvages, c'était une bonne occasion pour les seigneurs Nguyën de les annexer ». Et plus loin : « Le campa et le Cambodge étaient deux pays qui cherchaient à recourir à la piraterie. Si notre pays [Vietnam] lançait une guerre punitive contre ces deux contrées et en

occupait le territoire, ce serait tout simplement une mission confiée par le Ciel à un pays de haute civilisation pour initier des pays sauvages et ce serait aussi ' l'évolution naturelle de la loi générale ' que l'on ne peut guère éviter » (Hoang Cao Khài, Vi$l sir yèu (texte chinois de 1914 traduit en quôc ngû- en 1971), Saigon, 1971, p. 405 et p. 231). De son côté, Dào Vân Щ1 écrit : « Dans le vaste delta du Sud (...), on ne voit guère à cette époque d'autorité chargée d'administrer ce pays. Si les seigneurs Nguyën s'emparaient de cette région ou si le Cambodge décidait lui-même de l'offrir aux Nguyën, cela n'impliquerait aucune perte pour les Khmers » ((c)Ào Vàn Нф1, Tán An ngày xwa, Saïgon, 1972, p. 13). (3) P57, t. VI, p. 25. On reconnaît dans les deux titres les deux princes Padumarâjâ (Aňg Sûr) et Uday Surivans (Ang Tan'4 Cf aussi Mak Phoeun, op. cit., p. 355.

 

 

307

 

Surivans (Ang Tan '), who all the same time had called these troops¹, and then the Vietnamese leader attempt to place on the throne the former Khmer king Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand), and having made sure that he would recognize the vassal of the Court of Hue. Another consideration seems to have played its part in the decision of Hien Vuong to order this military intervention, it is the search of arms and goods necessary for the continuation of the war against the Trinh, objective that was noted well by Father J. Tissanier who writes that the Vietnamese leader, ordering to attack the Khmer country, hoped to find “all things necessary to wage war in Tunquin”².

 

 

The Vietnamese Attack

 

     Vietnamese sources do not provide much detail about the Vietnamese attack itself. Thus, the Gia dinh thông chi translated by G. Aubaret in 1863, does not even mention the penetration of the Vietnamese intervention troops inside the country, but just pointing out that these troops, consisting of two thousand soldiers³ ordered by the governor of Trân-biên-dinh⁴  well-appointed Yên, the major general Minh and captain Xuân, arrived in Mo-xoai (Ba-ria), which was taken. The Khmer King was then captured and taken to a cage to the province of Quang binh⁵

 

.     In fact, this translated text, which seems to have served as references to other Vietnamese historians do not correspond entirely to other Vietnamese historical texts⁶, with which it differs in some respect to the titles of the mandarins at the head of expedition and the number of the Vietnamese soldiers under their command. Thus, according to Bai namthuc luc tiên biên the Vietnamese wardlord “order phó tuóng of Trân-biên called Ton that Yên, to cai dôi called Xuân

 

(1) Un auteur vietnamien a fait cette remarque : « Le Bai Viêt attend toujours les occasions propices pour manifester ses volontés de domination et d'hégémonie » (Phan Koang, op. cit., p. 123).

(2) Relation du voyage du P. Ioseph Tissanier..., op. cit., p. 262.

Lorsqu'elles se retirèrent du Cambodge, les troupes vietnamiennes emportèrent avec elles un énorme butin.

(3) La traduction en quôc ngG* du Gia Dinh Thành Thông Chi (Saigon, t|ptrung, 1972, p. 6) donne 3.000 soldats.

(4) Selon une note de la traduction en quôc ngir du Gia Dinh Thành Thông Chi [op. cit., p. 6), Trân Bien Dinh est situé dans l'actuelle région de Phu Yen.

(5) G. Aubaret, op. cit., p. 2. Des documents occidentaux font aussi état de cette « cage de fer » (Q. Browne, op. cit., p. 55 ; W. J. M. Висн, op. cit., p. 230 ; Relation du voyage du P. Ioseph Tissanier..., p. 263).

Rappelons que le même traitement avait été infligé en 1653 par Hiên-Viromg au roi du campa, qui se donna la mort (cf. J. Boisselier, op. cit., p. 375 ; Relation du voyage du P. Ioseph Tissanier..., p. 261).

(6) Ainsi C. B.-Maybon a écrit que les Vietnamiens occupèrent Mô-xoai en 1658, que les Cambodgiens s'opposèrent à eux mais qu'ils furent mis en déroute et que le roi khmer fut fait prisonnier. De leurs côtés, Le Thành Khôi et Trmmg Vînh Ky ont écrit aussi que le seigneur vietnamien envoya deux mille hommes à Mô-xoai (C. B.-Maybon, op. cit., p. 116;

LE Thành Khôi, op. cit., 1981, p. 267 ; Truing Vïnh Ky, op. cit., p. 136).

 

 

 

308

 

 

MAK PHOEUN AND PO DHARMA

 

Thàng, to tham muru called Minh Lôc (we ignore the names of the family of these last two) to drive three thousand men to the military post of Hung-phuc¹. After attacking that post (Vietnamese army) captured Nac Ong Chân and took him to Vietnam”².     

 

     Dai Nam thuc luc tien bien does not mention either of the penetration of Vietnamese troops in the heart of the Khmer country and still seems to define the battle for the sole province of Bien Hoa. The Phu bien tap luc instead, although it does not describe the route of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, hints to the capital of this country: “Warlord Phuoc Tan ordered to his mandarins of the Dinh Tran Dinh bien, the Pho Tuóng given a title Hâu and called Yen Vo, the Cai Dôi given a title Hau³ and called Xuan Thang, the Tham Muru given a title Hau and called Minh Lôc, the Cau Kê given a title Bá and called Van Linh, to go with three thousand men to attack the South [Cambodia].This warlord chose 9th day of [9 months] as the date of shipment and wished that the expeditionary force is the 29th day in the walled city (Thanh) of Cambodia"⁴.

 

     Vietnamese historical documents do not thus describe the battle which set Khmer king Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand) in the Vietnamese intervention troops and just notes that the Khmer king was captured, without saying in what circumstances.    

 

     The Royal Chronicles of Cambodia, are much more explicit. They tell a Vietnamese fleet, composed of several thousand soldiers - two thousand soldiers to the royal chronicle P 57 and five thousand soldiers to the royal chronicles VJ VJ and P 63 - came to join the Khmer troops of the revolted princes Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) and Uday Surivans (Ang Tan ') in Phnom Penh^5, after having, said the royal chronicle D 57, attacked the province of Daung Nay (Dông-nai) and captured its governor, and attacking the other provinces on its way including dignitaries, noting the superioriy numbers of the Vietnamese forces, had fled. King Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand), surrounded by Cham, Malay and Khmer soldiers, began to lead the fleet of Cambodia, leaving the port of Kampong Luong, marched to

 

(1) Avant 1975, Mô-xôai, district de Phúc-chính, province de Biên-hôa.

(2) Dqi nam thuc 1цс lien bi$n, t. I, p. 98.

(3) Hâu et Bá sont le second et le troisième des 5 titres nobiliaires octroyés par le roi : Công « Duc », Hâu « Marquis », Bá « Comte », Tu « Vicomte ». Nam « Baron ». J. F. M.

Gênibrel, Dictionnaire Annamite-Français, 2e éd. Saigon, p. 294.

(4) LE Qui Don, op. cit., t. I, p. 88.

(5) Les chroniques royales du Cambodge donnent au général vietnamien qui command aictette expédition de 1658 le titre de Un Pïeii Dhur (ou encore Un Jïen Dhur, Un Bhûv Pien, Un Khim Mân Pïen Dhur). Selon les Hollandais, ce général, qui avait auparavant vaincu le roi du campa, portait en 1660 le titre de Ong-Karbeek-tong ; ils ajoutent qu'en cette année 1660, ce général fut battu par les troupes des Trinh, fait prisonnier et mis à mort (cf. W. J. M. Висн, op. cit., BEFEO, 1936, t. XXXVI, p. 147, n. 4). Les annales vietnamiennes font état d'un désastre des troupes des Nguyen, face aux Trjnh, en 1660-61, au cours duquel « les récentes conquêtes des Cochinchinois étaient perdues pour toujours », mais ne font pas état de la capture de leur général Htm Tân, ni de son second HO" Bât (cf. L. Cadière, « Le mur de Bông-HoHL Étude sur l'établissement des Nguyën en Cochinchine », BEFEO, 1906, t. VI, p. 209-211).

 

 

309

 

the port of Kampong Luong, marched to meet the enemy, preceded by a body of avant-garde led by Prince Kaev Hva (Ang Im). A fight took place on the river Tonle Sap at the village of Prek Ta Ten according to the royal chronicles VJ and P 63, in which the prince Kaev Hva (Ang Im) disappeared in the River. Vietnamese boats massed around the boat of king Rãmãdhipati I^st (Cau Bana Cand), who tried to retreat. The Vietnamese troops pursued them, overtook him and captured the king and senior dignitaries. Allied troops khmero-vietnamese were commanded by the chief of the Vietnamese expeditionary, Khmer princes Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) and Uday Surivans (Ang Tan ') did not participate in this war¹.

 

     According to Dutch documents, there was very little resistance from the Cambodian troops, which allowed the intervention troops of the Nguyen to obtain a complete success in a relatively short time². Father J. Tissanier even goes as far as writing that there was not even a resistance, as in his Relation we can read that the Vietnamese warlord sent to Cambodia one of his generals, “who with a few regiments of infantry, and of few small vessels entered without resistance in a kingdom that opened for him”³.

 

     All the texts mention the rapid defeat and capture King Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bana Cand) - which could partly be explained by the sudden reversal of alliances which followed the intervention of the former queen of Vietnamese origin Ang Cuv and Hien Vuong⁴, the Khmer king who had to be unprepared for a situation he had not planned - except N. Gervaise, who writes that the Khmer king fled before the Viet army. He continues that it was decided that Prince Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) would be declared king and the Vietnamese princess would share with him the government of kingdom⁵. They look for king Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bana Cand) who was hidden in an old temple. He was invited to come and explain to the “States Assembly”⁶. His speech and his eloquence have convinced, it was decided that king Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bana Cand) and Prince Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) would both go to the Court of Cochinchina to allow the Vietnamese leader to decide which of the two khmer princes ascend the throne of Cambodia. King Râmâdhipati (Cau Bana Cand) agreed to travel to country of Vietnam, but the prince Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) refused ⁷.

 

     While it is true that, as written by N. Gervaise, prince Padumarãjã

 

 

(1) Mak Phoeun, op. cit., p. 194-196 et p. 359-362.

(2) Winkel, op. cit., p. 1771 ; W. J. M. Висн, op. cit., 1937, p. 230.

(3) Relation du voyage du P. Ioseph Tissanier..., p. 262-263.

(4) Cf. supra, p. 302.

(5) On se rappellera que selon la chronique royale P57, cette princesse était déjà le second personnage du royaume sous le roi Râmâdhipatï Ier (Cau Banâ Cand).

(6) Selon E. Aymonier et B.-P. Groslier, ce temple serait celui d'Angkor Vat

(E. Aymonier, op. cit., 1904, p. 776 ; B.-P. Groslier, Angkor le Cambodge au XVIe siècle d'après les sources portugaises et espagnoles, Paris, 1958, p. 128).

(7) N. Gervaise, op. cit., p. 269-272.

 

 

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(Ang Sur) refused to surrender to Hien Vuong, this could explain the continuation of events, namely a reversal of the attitude of the Vietnamese warlord of Nguyen toward the revolted princes, reversal which was going to transform the allies of yesterday into enemies.

 

War between the Khmer Princes

and Vietnamese Intervention troops

 

 

 

     The first war of the Vietnamese intervention in the Khmer country should have ended with the defeat of King Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bana Cand) became reality by the disappearance of prince Kaev Hvâ (Ang Im) and the capture of Khmer King by the troops of Hien Vuong, troops which were officially came to Cambodia to remove off the throne the Khmer monarch. It was not what happened since the Royal Cambodian chronicles tell us that the Vietnamese, after capturing Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bana Cand), turned against the two princes Padumarãjã Khmer (Ang Sur) and Uday Surivans (Ang Tan '), who called for the (Vietnamese) intervention. While everyone tells his own way the causes of this new war, it seems that it has its origin in the will of the Vietnamese to take over the two princes (or the eldest of them) in order to place the Khmer kingdom under their domination.

 

     According to the royal chronicles VJ and P 63, after capturing king Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bana and), the Vietnamese did not bring him to Phnom Penh for the Khmer princes Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) and Uday Surivans ( Ang Tan '), but sent him directly to Vietnamese country, that would have greatly upset the two princes. However, they [the princes Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) and Uday Surivans ( Ang Tan ')] were unwilling to do anything, not to bother princess Ang Cuv, who was always with them. Leaving Phnom Penh then, and inviting this princess to follow them, they went to live in the capital, which is Oudong, but did not inform the Vietnamese warlord, that led the latter to a great irritation. Wanting to capture the two princes, the Vietnamese general asked them “by ruse” permission to send their troops to Oudong to take property that belonged to the former king to transfer them to the vietnamese country. The two princes made them carry to the Vietnamese by royal servants. Although they got what they requested, the Vietnamese marched into the capital of Oudong and set up bases military at the North of the bridge KhlaTram (Kampong Luong)¹.

 

     The royal chronicle P 57 provides a different version. While allied troops Khmero-Vietnamese were struggling with the army of Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Banã Cand), the two princes Padumarãjã (And Sur) and Uday Surivans (Ang Tan ') seized the capital Oudong. After learning the defeat of the Khmer king and his capture by the Vietnamese troops – according to P 57, the monarch, 

 

 

1)  Mak Phoeun, op. cit., p. 196-198.

 

 

 

311

 

a prisoner of the Vietnamese, was kept in Khmer territory and was taken to the Vietnamese territory only later, when Vietnamese troops withdrew – the two princes asked the high ranking officials to go to offer a big banquet to these troops. However, the head of the Vietnamese troops instructed his deputies to take property that belonged to the former king and leaving in Oudong. Having obtained the property, the Vietnamese wanted to also capture prince Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) to place Cambodia under their domination. They then returned to Oudong where they seized all weapons of war despite the protests of Khmer officials acting on the orders of the Khmer prince Padumarãjã (Ang Sur). And as he had not agreed to leave the royal palace, the Vietnamese attacked the town and looted it¹.

 

     The intent of Vietnamese to seize the Khmer princes Padumarãjã (Ang Sur)) and Uday Surivans (Ang Tan ') to place Cambodia under their control do not appear to have been revealed by other sources except, it seems, by N. Gervaise when he wrote that prince Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) was invited to go to the court of Cochinchina along with the King Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bana Cand), but he refused.

 

     The plundering of the Khmer country and its capital has been fully confirmed. Although Bai Nam thuc luc lien and Gia Dinh Thong chi are silent, the Phu biên lap luc de Lê Qui Dôn acknowledges when he says that after the Khmer army was defeated, the Vietnamese troops “arrested King Nac Chan and some chiefs of tribes living in this country and seized the horses, elephants and war materials to send to Quang Binh”². It is the same for Dutch people: “the Annamites, welcomed without strong resistance by the Cambodians, took the opportunity to ravage and plunder the country in a terrible way”³. Their stories, like the one of the missionaries, have reported a huge plunder committed by the Vietnamese, because the troops of Hué needed “twenty-seven large vessels and seventy small boats to bring the royal treasure” of the Khmers, while “eight hundred elephants, horses in many more, 1,600 artillery pieces” also fell into their hands⁴. For its part, the royal chronicle P 57 mentions that many things⁵ of royal property – including gold and silver accumulated over several reigns - swept away by the Vietnamese, not to mention weapons of all kinds⁶.

 

 

(1) Mak Phoeun, op. cit., p. 362-364.

(2) LE Qui Bon, op. cit., t. I, p. 88.

(3) A. Cabaton, op. cit., 1914, p. 191 ; Winkel, op. cit., p. 1771.

(4) Cf. H. Chappoulie, op. cit., 1. 1, p. 167, qui cite les missionnaires ; de son côté, le Père J. Tissanier dit que les troupes vietnamiennes avaient pris « quatre gros vaisseaux [et] plus de mille pièces d'artillerie » [Relation du voyage du P. Ioseph Tissanier..., p. 263).

(5) Un picul correspond à 60 kilogrammes.

(6) Mak Phoeun, op. cit., p. 362. Au sujet des pièces d'artillerie khmères, Pierre Poivre, qui a visité la Cochinchine entre 1748 et 1750, a trouvé dans la citadelle de Huê des canons portant les armes du Cambodge, et

qui proviendraient probablement du sac d'Oudong de 1658-1659 (cf. P.-Y. Manguin, op. cit., 1972, p. 207 ; L. Malleret, op. cit., 1974, p. 180).

 

 

 

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MAK PHOEUN AND PO DHARMA

 

     Foreigners who traded with Cambodia were not spared either. Thus, the English had a ship, the Little Fortune, destroyed, and Rawlins could not join Bantam, crossing Siam, only in August 1659¹. During the looting of Oudong and fire that ensued, the Dutch lodge was sacked and several of his staffs were killed, others Dutch, including their leader Pieter Kettingh, could go to Siam with English merchants and joined Bantam same month (August 1659)². It was during this attack that the Vietnamese troops of the Nguyen met Jean de la Croix, who was taken into Cochinchina and installed on around Hue by the order of Hien-Vuong, for whom he became of the favourite Mandarins³.

 

     A fight between former allies began, according to the royal chronicle P 57, in the early of the Cambodian year consecutively after the entry of Vietnamese troops in Khmer country, which is in March or in April 1659⁴. It ended with the departure of Vietnamese troops which had to leave the Khmer territory. For their part the Dutch do not give a date, merely noting that the Vietnamese intervention troops left Cambodia in 1659⁵.

 

     The withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia – who took with them king Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bana Cand), says P 57 – did not allow at that time the Khmer kingdom to have peace; Malay and Cham Muslims, the followers of the former monarch, taking up arms against prince Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) has now become master of Cambodia, first in Thbaung Khmum, then in the province of Nokor Wat (Siem Reap), from where they were expelled later. These Malays and the Cham, maybe accompanied by the former wife of the King, then took refuge in Siam. A lot of other Cambodians also took the road to exile, including the supreme leader of the community of monks, accompanied by relatives and supporters of the former monarch.

 

     The first Vietnamese military intervention in the affairs of Cambodia is realized in two stages. First, against the sovereign in place Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bana Cand) and for princes Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) and Uday Surivans (Ang Tan ') who revolted against him because of divisions within the Cambodian royal family.

 

(1) D. K. Basset, op. cit., p. 53.

(2) W. J. M. Висн, op. cit., 1937, p. 230.

(3) Le métis portugais Jean de la Croix, natif des Philippines et élevé à Macao, est un célèbre rondeur d'artillerie. Il était alors au service du roi Râmâdhipatî Ier (Cau Banâ Cand), qui lui avait donné un titre de dignitaire et l'avait fait gouverneur de province (cf. L'État présent..., p. 147 ; H. Chappoulie, op. cit., vol. I, p. 178, n. 1 ; P.- Y. Manguin, op. cit., 1972, p. 205).

(4) Les chroniques royales VJ et P63, qui fournissent un millésime inexact (1655), portent que ce combat eut lieu au mois de Jesth, c'est-à-dire en mai ou en juin (cf. Mak Phoeun, op. cit., p. 198 et p. 364).

(5) Winkel, op. cit., p. 1771.

(6) Mak Phoeun, op. cit., p. 368-370. Selon la chronique royale P57 l'épouse malaise du roi (?) qui se réfugia à Ayudhyâ portait le titre d'Anak Mnân Kapâh Pau (ajoutons que cette chronique royale n'avait pas fait précédemment état du mariage du roi Râmâdhipatî Ier

(Cau Baňa Candj avec une jeune fille malaise).

 

 

 

313

 

     Secondly, against those same princes then became sole masters of the kingdom, because the Vietnamese wanted to also capture them in order to vassal the Khmer country. This second stage of the struggle between Khmer and Vietnamese did not stop with the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Khmer territory. A new turn of events took place in fact, when the leader of Hue freed the former king Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bana Cand) and tried to replace him on the throne of Cambodia, an attempt directed against princes Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) and Uday Surivans (Ang Tan ') now considered by the Vietnamese as an obstacle to their control of the Khmer country.

 

The Release of Rãmãdhipati I and his death

 

 

 

     The Vietnamese sources mentioned that king Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Banã Cand) has been taken prisoner in Vietnamien country and even driven up, said the Phu bien tuc luc and Gia dinh thong chi 2 until the province Quâng binh², on the border of Tonkin, where was waiting the warlord Hien Vuong.³

    

Agreeing with the Royal Chronicles of Cambodia, Gia dinh thong chi adds, as the same as the Dai nam thuc luc tien bien, that the warlord Hien Vuong let the former Khmer monarch alive, and sent him to rule over Cambodia, “as long as he remains forever a vassal of the Empire of Annam and pay him the tribute regularly”. He was recommended not to cause any harm to the Annamite people living along the border”⁴.

The “pardon granted” to former Khmer king was therefore subject to two conditions that reflected well the true intentions of the Vietnamese leader Hien Vuong, when he ordered the military intervention in Cambodia after the former queen Ang Cuv had made a request. Because of these conditions, some authors, such as Phan Khoang, considered that from the

time of this expedition, Cambodia submitted to the Court of Hue and accepted the Vietnamese settlers on her territoiry⁵.  For their part, C. Madrolle and others like Thai Van Kiem argue that for the price of their intervention, the Vietnamese have taken the land of

Biên-Hoa.⁶

 

(1) Des documents hollandais et anglais portent que la reine, épouse du roi Ramâdhipatl Ier (Cau Baňa Cand) avait également été emmenée captive en pays vietnamien (cf. Winkel, op. cit., p. 1771 ; Q. Browne, op. cit., p. 55).

(2) Le Qui Don, op. cit., t. I, p. 88 ; G. Aubaret, op. cit., p. 2.

(3) L. Gadière, Résumé de Vhistoire ďAnnam, Quinhon (Annam), 1911, p. 94. Les Hollandais qui étaient conduits en avril 1661 à Faifo, à 32 km au Sud de Tourane, apprirent le passage dans cette ville de l'ancien roi khmer fait prisonnier par les Vietnamiens. On l'avait détenu dans « une maison commune, édifice ressemblant à une pagode, qui servait

de lieu d'assemblée, de salle de tribunal et de prison » (W. J. M. Висн, op. cit., 1936, p. 147).

(4) G. Aubaret, op. cit., p. 2. Le Bqi nam thvtc li*c lien bien ignore la deuxième condition.

(5) Phan Khoang, op. cit., p. 452.

(6) Cl. Madrolle, Indochine du Sud, Paris, 1928, p. xvi ; Thaï Vân KiÊm, op. cit., p. 384. Cf. aussi H. Chappoulie, op. cit., p. 168, n. 1.

Maybon écrit que les Vietnamiens occupèrent officiellement la région de Bà-ria dès le début de leur intervention militaire, laissant entendre par là que cette région fut placée sous l'administration des Nguyën à partir de cette époque (C. B.-Maybon, op. cit., p. 116).

 

 

 

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MAK PHOEUN AND PO DHARMA

 

     It is nonetheless legitimate to wonder about the real value of the conditions imposed by Vietnam since the former monarch Rãmãdhipatï I (Cau Bana Cand) had no more power and a new authority, prince Padumarãjã (Ang Sur), was settled in Oudong, the capital of the kingdom.

 

     The Royal Chronicles of Cambodia have also reported that the release of former Khmer monarch decided by the leader of Hue, but present it as a direct result of his irritation (discontent) because of the “ungratefulness” of princes Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) and Uday Surivans (Ang Tan) and their response to the Vietnamese intervention troops. Ignoring these conditions imposed on the former Khmer monarch by Hien Vuong, these texts mention that this latter would have liked to order his troops to attack Cambodia again and capture these two Khmer princes, but the fear of a condemnation by foreign countries would have deterred him from doing it.¹

 

     The release of former Khmer monarch was in fact only an attempt of the Vietnamese warlord to regain a foothold in the Khmer territory after the withdrawal of his troops, chased away by the two princes Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) and Uday Surivans (Ang Tan '). This Vietnamese’s attempt to restore the former Khmer king was not successful. According to Dai Nam thuc luc tien bien, the Vietnamese warlord ordered to escort the Khmer king to Cambodia, while Gia Dinh thong chi mentioned that he ordered to drive him to the capital of the kingdom². These two texts do not mention the death of Rãmãdhipatï (Cau Bañã Cand), any more than Biographies - Vietnamese documents relating to the reign of Gia Long and established by the order of Tu-Duc -which mentioned that the former Khmer king did not die until 1674, that is clearly a mistake³. In fact, the Royal Cambodian chronicles note that the former Khmer king, because of the hardships he suffered, fell sick and died shortly after his release while he was on road to Cambodia, that means in the year of 1659, in a place called Bat Anhchien.⁴ N. Gervaise wrote that the Vietnamese king, to whom the defeated Khmer king had surrendered, returned the crown to Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bañã Cand) and was “still nice enough to provide him escorts with his best troops” for allowing him to return with his throne.

 

 

(1) Mak Phoeun, op. cit., p. 199 et p. 365.

En fait, il semble bien que Hiên-Vmrng ne pouvait envisager une nouvelle invasion du territoire khmer, qui aurait affaibli son potentiel militaire, alors qu'il était, ne l'oublions pas, en lutte contre la seigneurie des Trinh (cf. H. Chappoulie, op. cit., vol. I, p. 168, n. 1).

(2) Bai nam thirc lue tien bien, t. I, p. 98 ; G. Aubaret, op. cit., p. 2.

(3) C. B.-Maybon, op. cit., p. xi et p. 117, n. 1.

(4) Cette localité correspond probablement à Bat-kien, sur le Vaïco occidental. En effet, on sait que vers 1770, un autre roi khmer s'enfuit dans une localité nommée aussi Bat Anhchien (plus exactement Tralong Klos Bat Anhchien, qu'il faut considérer comme deux noms séparés),

endroit désigné par le Gia âinh thông chi sous l'appellation de Bat-kien (= Bat Anhchien) et situé sur le territoire de Long-quât (probablement Tralong Klos) (cf. J. Moura, op. cit., t. II, p. 88 ; G. Aubaret, op. cit., p. 35).

(5) Voir supra, p. 305.

 

 

 

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But he adds that this king, on the way home, fell ill in Champa and died two days later.¹ Another source also notes that death. It is the testimony of the French bishops, which mentions that the former monarch died at Champa, but this testimony is certainly not right when it points out that the former king was a “prisoner of the King of Tonquin”.²

 

     The death of the former sovereign Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Banã Cand) ended the hopes of the Vietnamese to place him on the Khmer throne³ and legally invalidated the conditions imposed to him by Hien Vuong. In this regard, A. Leclere has written that after the death of the former king and according to the Vietnamese, Hien Vuong handed to Cambodia Khmer prisoners captured during the 1658-1659 military intervention only as a result of a “peace treaty” indicating that a tribute would be paid regularly by the Khmer kingdom to the Nguyen and that the people of this Vietnamese leader established in the Khmer kingdom will have full rights on all the lands they occupied.⁴ This statement is accurate or that the author was followed by others on this point, has it confused what Gia Dinh Thong chi said about the conditions imposed by Hien Vuong on Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bana Cand) for his release⁵ with a “ peace treaty”?

 

Khmer-Vietnamese relations after the death of Rãmãdhipati I

 

Although the Royal chronicles of Cambodia and the Vietnamese yearly documents were silent, the death of former King Rãmãdhipati (Cau Bañã Cand) did not put to an end the Vietnamese maneuvers of the leader of Huê in order to impose its suzerainty on the Khmer kingdom and to consolidate the settlements of Vietnamese people in Khmer territory. In contrast to other sources, N. Gervaise describes the relationship that existed between the Khmer rulers Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) and Uday Surivans (Ang Tan) and the Court of Hue after this death. According to this author, the former monarch before his death, had designated as his successor to the throne of Cambodia, not prince Padumarãjã (Ang Sur), but his younger brother, Prince Uday Surivans (Ang Tan), and had instructed the Commander of the Vietnamese troops who were escorting him to make a public statement. Prince Padumarãjã (Ang Sur) refused to comply with this decision, they have turned to the arbitration by the Vietnamese leader of Hue, who would have decided that the two brothers would share the kingdom into two and each of them would exercise the sovereignty over one of the two halves (parts).⁶

 

 

(1) N. Gervaise, op. cit., p. 272.

(2) Relation des missions et des voyages des Evesques vicaires apostoliques, et de leurs ecclésiastiques es années 1676 & 1677, Paris, 1680, p. 144.

(3) F. Garnier a supposé que cette tentative était à l'origine de la guerre entre Vietnamiens et Khmers dont on a précédemment parlé (cf. F. Garnier, op. cit., p. 368, n. 1 ;

C. B.-Maybon, op. cit., p. 117, n. 1).

(4) A. Leclère, op. cit., 1914, p. 351-352.

(5) Cf. supra, p. 313.

(6) N. Gervaise, op. cit., p. 273.

 

 

 

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It is probably excessive to say that Cambodia was divided into two parts, each under the authority of a king as a result of the Vietnamese military intervention from 1658 to 1659. N. Gervaise seems to indicate a situation that did not take place effectively only fifteen years later, that is to say from 1674, date of the second Vietnamese military intervention in Cambodia made precisely in favour of prince Uday Surivans (Ang Tan) who was competing for the Khmer throne when it was given to his nephew king Kaev Hva II (Ang Jï), son of Padumarãjã (Ang Sur). However, confirming in part the story of N. Gervaise, the Royal Cambodian chronicles relate that Prince Padumarãjã (Ang Sur), who had seized power in Oudong after the king Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Banã Cand) was captured by Vietnamese troops

and had received royal consecration in 1663 under the title Paramarãjã VIII in 1664 to his brother Uday Surivans (Ang Tan ') almost royal dignity Ubhayorâj, thereby giving him the highest office in the kingdom and giving him to preserve a number of provinces.¹ The testimony of the French bishops also confirms this fact, saying that during his reign, King Paramarãjã VIII (Ang Sur) ruled the kingdom almost alone and only left to his younger brother the title of “King without authorities”. This witness added that the last prince who married a daughter of former king Rãmãdhipati I (Cau Bana Cand) - details that could explain the designation of the prince to the throne by the former monarch before his death - the new king his brother offered to her a natural gift beautiful province of the kingdom.²

 

     However, the royal chronicles of Cambodia, as the story of the French bishops did not specify whether the elevation of prince Uday Surivans (Ang Tan ') to the dignity of Ubhayorâj had been made under pressure from the Nguyen or not. However, it is tempting to believe that this pressure existed, especially at the early years of his reign, King Paramarãjã VIII (Ang Sur) had to send tributes to the Court of Hue. According to Father L. Chevreuil, who arrived in Phnom Penh in 1665, the Khmer kingdom was at that point dependent on the Cochinchina.³ According to the same Father, Cambodia recovered its sovereignty only in 1667, taking advantage of an uprising of Chinese and Vietnamese living in Cambodia, which allowed king Paramarãjéa VIII (Ang Sur) to declare Cambodia independent and refuse to pay all tribute to the Vietnamese court of Huê, which made that trade between the two countries ceased.⁴

 

(1) Mak Phoeun, op. cit., p. 202-203 et p. 370-372.

(2) Relation des missions et des voyages..., p. 144-145.

(3) Relation des missions des évesques françois aux royaumes de Siam, de la Cochinchine, de Camboye, & du Tonkin, &c. Divisé en quatre parties, Paris, 1674, p. 139. On voit donc, d'après cette Relation qu'une des conditions imposées par Hié*n-Viromg à Râmâdhipatï Ier (Cau Banâ Cand) fut quand même réalisée, et ce en dépit de la mort de cet ancien monarque. La situation intérieure du Cambodge — révolte des cam et des Malais, troubles ayant entraîné plusieurs départs à l'étranger, rivalité possible du prince Uday Surivaňs (Ang Tan') — et la présence aux frontières des troupes de la cour de Huê qui accompagnaient Râmâdhipatï Ier (Cau Baflâ Cand) au moment de sa mort, ne devant pas être étrangères à cette situation.

(4) Relation des missions des évesques françois..., p. 158-159.

Selon le Père A. Launay, la lettre du Père Chevreuil faisant état du soulèvement mettant.

 

 

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     At the same time as the establishment of the suzerainty of the Vietnamese court on the Khmer kingdom, we may also wonder whether the king Paramarãjã VIII (Ang Sur) was not also obligated to protect the settlements of Vietnamese people living along the border of the Eastern regions. It seems unlikely there as well that king Paramaraja VIII (Ang Sur) was able to escape from this second condition imposed by Hien Vuong on Rãmãdhipati (Cau Banã Cand), especially during the early years of his reign, while he was under the suzerainty of the court of Hue. However, it seems premature to say, as was previously done during the lifetime of Rãmãdhipati (Cau Banã Cand)¹, there was at that time a transfer of territory - the province of Biên-hôa- because Gia Dinh Thong chi stipulates only that the Vietnamese warlord imposed on the former khmer monarch not to cause damage on the Nguyen subjects living in the border regions. Moreover, according to the same text, the official occupation of the territory of Bong-nai (Ben-hoa) by the Nguyen did not take place approximately forty years later, in 1699 exactly, when this territory was transformed in huyên of Phuoc-long². For their part, the royal chronicles of Cambodia did not state at any moment about a transfer of territory in that period. As for the Dutch texts, they report on the indication of the king Paramarãjã VIII (Ang Sur) himself, made in 1664, that the maritime border of Cambodia was at North of Cap St. Jacques³. For its part, the religious Labbe noted in 1710 that the Vietnamese had begun to settle in the region Don nai for 35 or 40 years⁴, which therefore defer the date of occupation of territory by the Vietnamese at the earliest to 1670.

 

     It nevertheless remains true, however, there was really or not official transfer of territory, that Vietnamese settlers who came to temporarily live on Khmer lands, before or after the Vietnamese military intervention, could now continue to benefit from the land “borrowed”, invading progressively a region

 

 

aux prises Chinois et Vietnamiens porte la date du 11 juin 1666 (A. Launay, Histoire de la mission de Cochinchine, 1658-1823. Documents historiques, I, 1658-1728, Paris, 1923, p. 71-72). Cette date de 1666 ne nous paraît pas exacte, puisque dans cette même lettre le Père Chevreuil

précise qu'il était au Cambodge depuis trois ans. Or comme il y était arrivé en novembre 1665, il faut lire soit 1668 soit 1667 si on compte suivant la tradition khmère. Quoi qu'il en soit, la date du soulèvement précité ne pouvait être 1666, puisqu'il survint trois mois après

la remise de ses pouvoirs au Père Chevreuil par l'administrateur de l'évêché de Malacca, Paul d'Acosta, qui quitta le Cambodge le lendemain. Or la Relation des missions des évesques françois précise que le soulèvement en question eut lieu trois mois après le départ de

Paul d'Acosta qui eut lieu en 1667 (cf. H. Chappoulie, op. cit., vol. I, p. 188, n. 3). La date de 1667 s'accorde d'ailleurs bien avec les sources hollandaises qui notent que cette année-là, les Chinois assassinèrent mille Vietnamiens, à la suite de quoi leur chef promit au roi de ne plus attaquer personne, pas même les ennemis de Sa Majesté, sans lui en demander auparavant l'autorisation (cf. W. J. M. Висн, op. cit., p. 234-235).

(1) Cf. p. 313.

(2) G. Aubaret, op. cit., p. 8.

(3) W. J. M. Висн, op. cit., 1937, p. 232. La frontière maritime à cette époque, était donc la même que précédemment.

(4) Cf. G. Taboulet, La geste française en Indochine, Paris, 1955, t. I, p. 95 ; cf. aussi J.Boisselier, op. cit., p. 376.

 

 

318

 

 

MAK PHOEUN AND PO DHARMA

 

far from their homeland, and preparing a final annexation of this region.

 

*

*      *

 

 

     Under a policy of expansionism to the South and in the perspective to place Cambodia in the sphere of influence of the warlord Nguyen, the first military intervention of the court of Hue in Cambodia made in 1658-1659 following the division within the Khmer royal family to support a prince against his king, while the king was not the cause of any hostile acts against the Vietnamese warlord Nguyen, transformed the prince into the master of the kingdom, a ruler who became the vassal of the Court of Huê, and consolidated the Vietnamese settlement on the Khmer lands located in the East of the country, lands temporarily occupied at the beginning by the subjects of Nguyên, but which were going to be occupied permanently and definitively. This military intervention highlights a Vietnamese political practice that had proved itself, and that was to give in marriage to the monarchs of other nations Vietnamese princesses, whose mission was nothing more than to extend the influence and expansion of the Viet country in foreign lands. The marriage of princess Ang Cuv with king Jayajettã II - as the selection and appointment of the princess for this mission - do not correspond to a fortuitous event, but a part of a political strategy previously defined and developed, which in fact served the expansionist ambitions of the Nguyên toward the southern countries.¹

 

     This Vietnamese attack also marked the beginning of a new situation for Cambodia. Now, the Khmer country will be exposed, not a single neighbour, Siam, but two, who each of them in their turn, will seek to amputate the territory of Cambodia and to place it in their zone of influence. As the pressure of the Siamese, that of Nguyên did not loosen, but instead will strongly increase, since less than fifteen years after the first Vietnamese military intervention, a second will be held to support again a prince against another. And when hostilities between the Trinh, the Vietnamese warlords of North, and the Nguyên, the Vietnamese warlords of South, had ended in 1673, these latter, freed from the threat of North, committed all their forces to continue their policy of expansion into South at the expense of Cambodia, exploiting the quarrels between Khmer princes and playing fully the interventionism.

 

Paris, October 1982.

 

 

(1) Nous reviendrons sur le cas des princesses vietnamiennes données en mariage à des rois khmer, cam et lao dans un autre article.